Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Brandon Potts appealed after a district court granted summary judgment to the City of Devils Lake and the Devils Lake Police Department (collectively, “Devils Lake”), which dismissed his claim for wrongful termination. Potts argued the court erred in holding under North Dakota law that no exception to the employment-at-will doctrine existed for law enforcement officers who act in self-defense. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in holding under North Dakota law no public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine exists for law enforcement officers who act in self-defense. Therefore, the court did not err in granting summary judgment to Devils Lake. View "Potts v. City of Devils Lake, et al." on Justia Law

Kathleen Melaas appealed a district court order granting a motion to compel arbitration and dismissing her complaint against Diamond Resorts U.S. Collection Development, LLC. She alleged Diamond Resorts offered vacation and timeshare packages, she attended a sales meeting with a Diamond Resorts representative, the sales meeting lasted approximately five hours, and she asked to leave the meeting on at least one occasion and Diamond Resorts refused to allow her to leave. She claimed Diamond Resorts knew she was a diabetic and experienced fatigue and confusion, Diamond Resorts knew she was a vulnerable adult subject to a durable power of attorney for financial management, and Diamond Resorts would not allow her to leave the sales meeting until she signed the timeshare agreement. Melaas asserted she lacked the capacity to enter into the agreement, Diamond Resorts used high-pressure and abusive sales tactics and knowledge of her medical condition to unduly influence and coerce her into signing the agreement, and any consent was obtained by duress and menace. After a hearing, the district court granted Diamond Resorts’ motion to compel arbitration and dismissed Melaas’ complaint. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the forum selection clause in section 17 of the contract was not part of the arbitration agreement. The forum selection clause stated, “This Agreement is governed by Nevada law without regard to Nevada’s choice of law rules. You must bring any legal action in Clark County, Nevada.” When the term “Agreement” was used in the contract, the Court found it referred to the entire contract and not the arbitration agreement. To the extent Diamond Resorts argued the action should have been brought in Nevada, it was a venue issue and not a jurisdictional issue, and the right could be waived. The issue of improper venue was waived if it was omitted from a motion to dismiss or if it was not made by motion or included in the responsive pleading. On remand, if any of the parties argue the case must be dismissed under the forum selection clause, the district court must first determine whether a contract exists. If the court determines a contract exists, it could then consider the forum selection clause issue, including whether the issue was waived. The order compelling arbitration and dismissing Melaas' complaint was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Melaas v. Diamond Resorts U.S. Collection Development" on Justia Law

Laron Young appealed summary judgment entered in favor of Burleigh Morton Detention Center (“BMDC”). Young was an inmate at BMDC. Reliance Telephone of Grand Forks, Inc. (“Reliance”) contracted with BMDC to operate its inmate telephone system. Every call that was not listed as “private” within the Reliance system was automatically recorded. It was undisputed that the telephone number for Young’s attorney was not on the list of private numbers and various calls between himself and his attorney were recorded. Young sued BMDC and Reliance arguing his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated and that BMDC had not complied with N.D.C.C. 12- 44.1-14(1), which required correctional facilities to ensure inmates have confidential access to their attorneys. The district court dismissed the claims against Reliance for lack of jurisdiction, and granted summary judgment in favor of BMDC, concluding Young had not alleged facts to support a finding that he was prejudiced by the recordings and therefore his right to counsel was not violated. The court also concluded Young had not alleged facts to support a finding that BMDC violated N.D.C.C. 12-44.1-14(1). The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, that to the extent relief might be available for Young’s claim, he did not allege facts to support a finding that BMDC knowingly intruded into the communications he had with his attorney or that prejudice or a substantial threat of prejudice existed. Therefore, the district court did not err when it granted BMDC summary judgment on Young’s Sixth Amendment claim. With respect to Young's statutory claim, the Court found the plain language of the statute did not require correctional facilities to affirmatively identify an inmate's attorney's telephone number as Young argued. Rather, by its own language, N.D.C.C. 12-44.1-14 was “subject to reasonable . . . correctional facility administration requirements.” The Court thus concluded BMDC’s policy allowing inmates or their attorneys to register attorney telephone numbers as confidential numbers not to be monitored did not constitute a violation of N.D.C.C. 12- 44.1-14(1). View "Young v. Burleigh Morton Detention Center, et al." on Justia Law

Brendel Construction appealed a district court judgment affirming an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision to hold Brendel Construction liable for unpaid workers compensation premiums and penalties attributed to a subcontractor’s account, and determining Randy Brendel was personally liable for unpaid workers compensation premiums. North Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) cross-appealed the district court’s order dismissing WSI’s cross-appeal from the decision of the ALJ as untimely filed. WSI identified Brendel Construction as the general contractor for a roofing project in Bismarck where crew members were reported to be working without fall protection. WSI’s investigation of the report regarding the lack of fall protection expanded into an investigation of workers compensation coverage. WSI ultimately concluded that two of Brendel Construction’s subcontractors, Alfredo Frias and Daniel Alvidrez, were uninsured and not providing North Dakota workers compensation coverage for their employees. WSI requested, but did not receive, information from Brendel Construction regarding the subcontractors’ income. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of liability against Brendel Construction for unpaid workers compensation premiums and penalties, and affirmed the imposition of liability against Randy Brendel. The Court reversed and remanded the dismissal of WSI’s cross-appeal as untimely filed. View "Brendel Construction v. WSI" on Justia Law

This was the second appeal involving this matter. In the first appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s finding that there was a confidential relationship between Richard Twete and Clinton Mullin, and that Mullin committed a breach of trust, but the Court reversed an attorney’s fees award to Twete against Mullin and remanded “for further consideration and explanation of the legal basis authorizing the award of attorney fees in this case.” On remand, the parties briefed and argued whether the district court should award Twete his attorney’s fees. In March of 2020, the district court again granted Twete’s attorney’s fees request. Mullin appealed that order, arguing the district court abused its discretion through misapplication and misinterpretation of the law. To this, the Supreme Court agreed: the district court misinterpreted the law and abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded again for further proceedings. View "Twete v. Mullin, et al." on Justia Law

Discover Bank (Discover) appealed a district court order denying its motion for judgment and dismissing the case. Discover sued Bryan Hornbacher, alleging he was indebted to it on a credit card debt for $14,695.13. The parties entered into a stipulation and consent. The stipulation provided an acknowledgment by Hornbacher that he had been served with the summons and complaint and an admission that he had no defenses to the allegations in the complaint. Hornbacher consented to entry of judgment in the amount of $14,695.13 in exchange for Discover’s agreement to accept $10,080.00 payable over three years as full satisfaction of the judgment, and to forego execution on the judgment unless there were a default in the agreed-upon payment schedule. In its order, the trial court found that “[p]laintiff files a stipulation stating it will not move for judgment unless the terms of the agreement are [breached].” The North Dakota Supreme Court found this was an error, as was the trial court's focus on the lack of default under the stipulation having occurred: "Discover was not moving to execute the judgment, but rather was, by affidavit, moving for judgment to be entered against Hornbacher pursuant to the stipulation. The court misread the stipulation and misapplied the law." Because the plain language of the stipulation provided for judgment against Hornbacher to be entered, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment. View "Discover Bank v. Hornbacher" on Justia Law

Riley Kuntz appealed the district court’s default judgment entered in his favor. Kuntz sued Ashlynn Leiss and Joseph Westbrook for trespass and theft of his cat trap. Neither Leiss nor Westbrook answered the complaint or otherwise appeared. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted default judgment in favor of Kuntz. The court found a trespass and conversion of the cat trap had occurred. The court awarded Kuntz a money judgment for conversion of the cat trap, but found he did not suffer any actual damages as a result of the trespass. Kuntz argues the district court erred by denying his damages for trespass. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kuntz v. Leiss, et al." on Justia Law

Amber Sather appealed a trial court judgment in hers and Adam Sather's divorce, a judgment that included a parenting plan for the parties’ children. She argued the district court erred by failing to include certain parenting plan provisions in the judgment. The North Dakota Supreme Court found section 14-09-30, N.D.C.C., required all parenting plans, including plans stipulated to and adopted by the court, to contain provisions regarding decision-making responsibility, dispute resolution, transportation and exchanges, and summer parenting time; or an explanation as to why the provisions were not included. The parenting plan here did not include these provisions or explain why they were not included. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred by adopting the parties’ parenting plan without either all of the information in N.D.C.C. section 14-09-30(2) being included, or after considering the best interests of the children as required by N.D.C.C. section 14-09- 30(1), providing its own findings regarding the same. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Sather v. Sather" on Justia Law

BNSF Railway Co. (“BNSF”) appealed a jury verdict and money judgment entered in favor of David Rentz. In July 2012, a tractor-trailer driven by Rentz was struck by a train operated by BNSF and train engineer, Reinaldo Guitian, Jr. The collision occurred at a public railroad grade crossing. In December 2015, Rentz sued BNSF and Guitian for personal injuries sustained during the vehicle/train collision. Guitian was subsequently dismissed as a named defendant in the action. Trial was held over eleven days in January 2019. Guitian was designated as BNSF’s party representative under N.D.R.Ev. 615 and was not sequestered from the courtroom. The jury returned a verdict finding Rentz 15% at fault and BNSF 85% at fault. A money judgment was entered in favor of Rentz. BNSF asserted it was denied a fair trial because: (1) BNSF’s designated representative at trial was allowed to be questioned beyond the scope of his knowledge; (2) video and audio clips taken from discovery depositions of BNSF’s designated representatives were improperly played during opening and closing arguments; (3) BNSF’s internal operating procedures were improperly used to modify the standard of care; and (4) opinion testimony of the investigating highway patrol trooper was excluded from evidence. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the questioning of BNSF’s representative at trial exceeded his personal knowledge and affected a substantial right, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "Rentz v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

David Buller appealed a district court order granting a petition for commitment of a sexually dangerous individual. On January 23, 2020, the State filed a petition for civil commitment of Buller as a sexually dangerous individual. On January 28, 2020, following a preliminary hearing, the district court entered an order of dismissal of the petition after finding the State failed to establish Buller had a condition that was manifested by a sexual disorder, personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction. On January 30, 2020, sua sponte and without notice to the parties, the court issued an order vacating the prior order dismissing the petition and finding probable cause was established to commit Buller. On February 19, 2020, Buller filed a petition for writ of mandamus to this Court. This Court exercised supervisory jurisdiction and vacated the district court’s January 30, 2020 order after considering the procedural irregularity of the second order issued sua sponte and without notice to the parties. On March 6, 2020, the State filed a new petition and started a new proceeding seeking commitment of Buller as a sexually dangerous individual. Buller requested dismissal of the new petition asserting res judicata precluded a second petition because the January 28, 2020 order dismissing the petition following the preliminary hearing was not vacated in the first proceeding. After completion of an evaluation in which two doctors reached an opinion Buller met the criteria of a sexually dangerous individual, the district court again issued an order granting the petition seeking commitment. Buller argued the proceedings in this case were bared by res judicata and the order for commitment was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Interest of Buller" on Justia Law