Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pioneer State Mutual Insurance Company appealed a declaratory judgment that found the automobile policy issued by Pioneer to Ty Kirby provided insurance coverage. In 2017, Kirby was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Mary Miller. Kirby was driving a 2002 Dodge Ram owned by his employer, Bear Creek Gravel, Inc. One of Kirby’s co-workers had forgotten his lunch and Kirby instructed him to meet him at the intersection of two nearby highways where Kirby would bring him a sandwich. After purchasing the sandwich, filling the 2002 Dodge Ram with fuel, and delivering the sandwich to his co-worker, Kirby began crossing the intersection. Kirby proceeded through the intersection and collided with Miller, who died as a result of the collision. Kirby purchased an automobile insurance policy from Pioneer effective from April 1, 2017 to October 1, 2017. The policy covered Kirby even if he was driving a vehicle he did not own. However, the policy excluded coverage for any vehicle “furnished or available for [Kirby’s] regular use.” The regular use exclusion was the basis for Pioneer’s denial of liability coverage for the accident. The district court concluded the 2002 Dodge Ram was not furnished for Kirby’s regular use because several restrictions existed for Kirby’s use of the vehicle. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded evidence and inferences about restrictions on Kirby's use of the vehicle supported the district court's decision the regular use exclusion did not apply. Therefore, the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "Pioneer State Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bear Creek Gravel, et al." on Justia Law

Shawn Kluver and Little Knife Disposal, LLC (“Little Knife”), appealed an amended judgment entered after a bench trial that awarded Command Center, Inc., monetary damages, interest, attorney’s fees and costs against Renewable Resources, LLC, and Kluver, jointly and severally. The amended judgment also awarded Renewable Resources damages and interest against Kluver and Little Knife, jointly and severally, and ordered them to indemnify Renewable Resources for all damages, interest, attorney’s fees, and costs awarded to Command Center. Command Center provided temporary labor services. Command Center sued Renewable Resources in small claims court, claiming unpaid amounts totaling $14,631.20, relating to temporary labor services that Command Center provided under agreements with Renewable Resources. Renewable Resources removed the case to district court. Command Center obtained leave of court to file an amended complaint, naming Kluver and Little Knife as additional defendants. Kluver had been the manager of Renewable Resources. Although Renewable Resources was billed and had paid Command Center $20,000 for the temporary labor services, Renewable Resources alleged that the temporary labor services were provided for the benefit of Little Knife, and that Kluver did not have authority to contract on behalf of Renewable Resources for the temporary labor services that benefited Little Knife. On review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that evidence presented at trial supported the district court’s findings of fact and, further, that Kluver and Little Knife were rearguing the evidence and challenging the district court’s weight and credibility determinations. "We will not second-guess the district court’s clear findings on appeal. On this record, we conclude the district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous." View "Command Center v. Renewable Resources, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants Somerset Court, LLC, and Kari Riggin appealed a district court judgment dismissing their action seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of the North Dakota Governor’s executive orders. This case began as a challenge to the Governor’s statutory powers in issuing executive orders during the COVID-19 pandemic relating to the operations of certain North Dakota businesses. In April 2020, Somerset, an assisted living facility with an in-house salon, and Riggin, a licensed cosmetologist operating the salon as an independent contractor, claimed the executive orders prohibited Somerset and Riggin from engaging in their business and profession, and placed limitations as to their business and profession. Appellants argued the executive orders were beyond the Governor’s statutory powers; the executive orders involved fundamental rights requiring the application of the strict scrutiny standard of review; and that a declaratory judgment should have been issued as a matter of law and enforced by an appropriate writ. Because Appellants failed to adequately challenge the district court’s conclusion the case was moot, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Somerset Court, et al. v. Burgum, et al." on Justia Law

James Lund appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Leland Swanson and Open Road Trucking, LLC. Lund had been an adverse party to Swanson and Open Road in a series of lawsuits, dating back to 2018. Trial in one of the lawsuits was scheduled to begin December 3, 2019. On the day before trial, Lund, Swanson, Open Road, and their respective counsel met to discuss settling the lawsuits between them. Swanson and Open Road were represented by the same attorneys. After the meeting, Lund’s attorney, Sean Foss, contacted the district court to inform it that the parties had resolved the matter scheduled for trial the following day, and asked the court to “take the trial off the calendar.” Attorney Foss then sent an email to counsel for Swanson and Open Road, with the subject line “settlement,” containing his notes regarding the settlement terms. On December 10, 2019, Swanson and Open Road’s attorney, Randolph Stefanson, emailed Foss a proposed settlement agreement, which included the same terms as Foss’s email. Two days later, Foss emailed Swanson and Open Road’s attorneys a revised version of the proposed settlement agreement. That same day, the North Dakota Supreme Court issued an opinion on one of the parties' pending cases which was on appeal at the time. In that case, the Supreme Court concluded a “judgment was not satisfied as between Swanson and Lund, and Open Road was entitled to take an assignment of the judgment from Swanson to enforce Swanson’s right of contribution from Lund for one-half of the judgment amount.” The Court reversed the district court’s order directing entry of satisfaction of the judgment, and remanded for entry of a charging order against Lund's transferrable interests in specified limited liability companies. Ultimately, no written settlement agreement was signed by the parties. In January 2020, Lund initiated this action against Swanson and Open Road to enforce the alleged settlement agreement. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the district court denied Lund’s motion and granted summary judgment in favor of Swanson and Open Road, concluding the statute of frauds barred enforcement of the settlement agreement. Lund appealed. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Lund v. Swanson, et al." on Justia Law

Chris Oden appealed a district court order vacating a transcribed Missouri foreign judgment. Oden argued: (1) vacating the transcribed Missouri judgment violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution; (2) the court erred in relying on a decision issued between the parties in prior litigation because that decision was barred by administrative res judicata as the result of Oden’s Missouri workers compensation claim; and (3) the court erred by affording a prior judgment res judicata effect while that case was pending on appeal. In May 2010, Oden was injured in Missouri while employed by Minot Builders Supply. North Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) accepted the claim and awarded benefits for Oden’s injuries. In May 2013, Oden filed a claim for compensation in Missouri for the same work-related injury. In October 2013, WSI suspended payment of further benefits on Oden’s claim after Oden claimed benefits Missouri. Subsequent to Oden settling his Missouri workers compensation claim, WSI sent Oden notice that the prior North Dakota workers compensation award was being reversed because Oden’s receipt of benefits in Missouri. WSI provided notice to Oden his workers compensation benefits were being denied, informed Oden he would need to reimburse WSI, and informed Oden he had thirty days to request reconsideration. Oden did not request reconsideration of WSI’s decision. In July 2018, WSI commenced an action in North Dakota against Oden seeking reimbursement for previous payments made to Oden. The district court in the Burleigh County case granted summary judgment in favor of WSI and awarded WSI the full amount paid to Oden, plus accruing interest, costs, and disbursements. Oden argued in the North Dakota case that WSI was bound by the Missouri workers compensation settlement because the settlement agreement included a signature of an attorney purportedly acting on behalf of WSI. The court determined WSI could not be bound by the Missouri agreement because WSI was not a party to the settlement, and there was no evidence to support a finding that the attorney who purportedly signed on behalf of WSI had any authority to represent WSI or act as WSI’s agent. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Oden v. Minot Builders Supply, et al." on Justia Law

Cory Davis appealed a district court order denying his motion for Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., relief from a judgment. In September of 2019 Tracy Davis served Cory with a summons and complaint for divorce. Cory did not prepare or serve a formal answer. On October 14, 2019, the district court issued an order for mediation. The parties attended mediation without final resolution of their case. After a mediation closing form was filed the court issued a scheduling order and notice of bench trial for January 23, 2020. On December 13, 2019, Tracy filed a motion for default judgment. That same day she served Cory with the motion by mail. On December 23, 2019, the district court issued an order granting default judgment, along with judgment by default. On January 8, 2020, Cory filed an answer and counterclaim, notice of motion for relief from judgment, and brief in support of motion for Rule 60 relief, arguing he did not receive the time required under N.D.R.Ct. 3.2 to respond to Tracy's motion for default. On appeal of the denial of relief, Cory argued the court erred in denying his motion because the judgment was entered prior to the expiration of his time to respond under N.D.R.Ct. 3.2(a). After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the default judgment and provide Cory an opportunity to respond consistent with N.D.R.Ct. 3.2(a)(2). View "Davis v. Davis, et al." on Justia Law

Cherokee Services Group, LLC; Cherokee Nation Government Solutions, LLC; Cherokee Medical Services, LLC; Cherokee Nation Technologies, LLC (collectively referred to as the “Cherokee Entities”); Steven Bilby; and Hudson Insurance Company (“Hudson Insurance”) appealed district court orders and a judgment reversing an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) order. The ALJ’s order concluded the Cherokee Entities and Bilby were protected by tribal sovereign immunity and Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) had no authority to issue a cease and desist order to Hudson Insurance. The district court reversed the ALJ’s determination. The Cherokee Entities were wholly owned by the Cherokee Nation; Bilby served as executive general manager of the Cherokee Entities. Hudson Insurance provided worldwide workers’ compensation coverage to Cherokee Nation, and the Cherokee Entities were named insureds on the policy. WSI initiated an administrative proceeding against the Cherokee Entities, Bilby, and Hudson Insurance. WSI determined the Cherokee Entities were employers subject to North Dakota’s workers’ compensation laws and were liable for unpaid workers’ compensation premiums. WSI also ruled that Bilby, as executive general manager, was personally liable for unpaid premiums. WSI ordered the Cherokee Entities to pay the unpaid premiums, and ordered Hudson Insurance to cease and desist from writing workers’ compensation coverage in North Dakota. The Cherokee Nation had no sovereign land in North Dakota, and the Cherokee Entities were operating within the state but not on any tribal lands. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court judgment, and reinstated and affirmed the ALJ’s order related to the cease and desist power of WSI, but the matter was remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings on the issue of sovereign immunity. View "WSI v. Cherokee Services Group, et al." on Justia Law

Menard, Inc. (“Menards”) appealed an order denying a motion for summary judgment, an order denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law, an order granting attorney’s fees, an order as to the amount of attorney’s fees recoverable and entry of judgment, and a judgment. In 2013, Darlene Johnson visited a Menards store in Minot to exchange an item. A Menards employee directed Johnson to find the exchange in the store and return to the service counter. Johnson turned toward her right and started walking away. Almost immediately, Johnson tripped over a flatbed cart. The cart was one Menards offers its customers to use while in the store. As a result of the trip and fall, Johnson cracked seven teeth. 2017, Johnson filed a negligence action against Menards in small claims court seeking damages in the amount of $14,818.00. Menards removed the case to district court. Johnson then amended her claim with the consent of Menards. In the amended complaint, Johnson sought a jury trial and “a reasonable amount but not less than $50,000” in damages. Before trial, Menards moved for summary judgment contesting whether sufficient facts created a duty of care it owed to Johnson. The court denied the motion. At trial, Menards moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Johnson’s case. Menards again claimed insufficient evidence existed to require a duty of care Menards owed Johnson. Alternatively, Menards argued it had met any duty it owed Johnson. The court denied the motion. Menards did not renew its motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of its case or after the jury returned the verdict. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, but remanded for consideration of Johnson's attorney's fees for this appeal. View "Johnson v. Menard, Inc." on Justia Law

Rebecca Burr appealed a district court judgment dismissing her complaint against the North Dakota Board of Dental Examiners. In mid-2019, Burr filed a complaint with the North Dakota Board of Dental Examiners alleging a dentist previously licensed by the Board committed aggravated assault and permanently maimed her in 1989. Her original complaint to the Board stated she had reached out to the Board in 1996 by sending a letter outlining some of the same complaints that were in the 2019 formal complaint. The Board responded to Burr’s complaint with a formal letter stating that it had determined “there is not a reasonable basis to believe that a violation of NDCC 43-28-18 or the rules promulgated by the Board occurred” and that the matter was dismissed without any action having been taken. In January 2020, Burr served the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) a notice of claim in the amount of $250,000, alleging that the Board failed to satisfy its legal obligation to investigate her claim “and that the failure to do so caused Ms. Burr further harm, pain and suffering.” In February 2020, OMB notified Burr by letter that her claim had been denied. Burr did not pursue an administrative appeal of that decision. She then commenced this action by serving the Board and OMB with a summons and complaint in May 2020. The district court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss, finding it lacked jurisdiction, and concluding that the Board was entitled to both quasi-judicial immunity and discretionary immunity. On appeal, Burr argued the district court erred in concluding that the Board was entitled to discretionary immunity and in dismissing her complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burr v. N.D. State Board of Dental Examiners" on Justia Law

Hellervik Oilfield Technologies LLC (“Hellervik”) appealed an order denying its motion to vacate a default judgment. AE2S Construction, LLC (“AE2S”) sued Hellervik and Whiting Oil and Gas, Corporation, for nonpayment of its labor, materials, and services in the construction of a mobile gas capture plant in western North Dakota. Hellervik’s registered agent, Gary Minard, received the summons and complaint on September 9, 2019. Hellervik conceded it was properly served. Hellervik did not answer or otherwise respond to the complaint within twenty- one days, as required by N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(1)(A). AE2S applied for default judgment against Hellervik, without serving notice of the application on Hellervik. The district court granted the application, and judgment was entered in favor of AE2S against Hellervik. In November 2019, Hellervik moved to vacate the judgment, arguing, in part, AE2S was required to serve notice of the application for default judgment on it because it made an appearance through counsel. Prior to suit, in June and July 2019, AE2S’s attorney corresponded with Hellervik’s attorney via email. Hellervik argued this correspondence constituted an appearance. Hellervik argued the district court erred by concluding it did not make an appearance for purposes of N.D.R.Civ.P. 55(a), and abused its discretion by denying it relief under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6). Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "AE2S Construction v. Hellervik Oilfield Technologies, et al." on Justia Law