Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Henry H. Behle IV appealed the grant of summary judgment and award of attorney’s fees in favor of Darren Harr as personal representative of the Estate of Henry L. Behle. Behle filed a petition asking the district court to determine the validity of the decedent’s will and convert the administration to a formal probate. Harr, as personal representative of the Estate, objected to Behle’s petition and moved for summary judgment. Behle argued the probate application was defective because an electronic copy of the decedent’s will was filed with the district court rather than the original. Behle also claimed Harr asserted undue influence over the decedent. The district court granted Harr’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the probate to proceed informally. Harr thereafter moved for an award of attorney's fees. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Behle’s contentions only amounted to suspicion; viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Behle, no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding undue influence. Therefore, the Court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment. However, the Supreme Court found the district court erred in ordering Behle to pay attorney's fees: the district court did not analyze whether the allegations in Behle’s petition were made in good faith when it awarded attorney’s fees under N.D.C.C. 28-26-31. Instead, the district court focused on Behle’s arguments made in opposition to summary judgment. "The plain words of the statute pertain only to pleadings and not to motions or other documents. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under N.D.C.C. 28-26-31." View "Estate of Behle" on Justia Law

Michael J. Tharaldson executed an “Irrevocable Trust Agreement” on February 14, 2007. The trust named State Bank & Trust (now known as Bell Bank), as trustee. On October 3, 2011, Tharaldson executed an “Irrevocable Trust Agreement II” and merged assets from the first trust into the second trust. Tharaldson died intestate on December 11, 2017. On June 28, 2019, Bell Bank filed a petition seeking the district court’s determination of trust beneficiaries and approval of asset distribution. Bell Bank claimed the sole beneficiary was Tharaldson’s brother, Matthew Tharaldson. Tharaldson had three biological children. Bell Bank mailed its petition, proposed order, and notice of hearing to the two adult children. Bell Bank sent the documents via email to the attorney representing Tharaldson’s minor child, E.M., in the separate probate action. E.M. challenged the court's jurisdiction after it ultimately granted Bell Bank's petition to distribute the trust assets. The district court found the language of the trust was not ambiguous, Tharaldson died intestate, and Matthew Tharaldson was the sole beneficiary of the trust, entitling him to distribution of all trust assets. E.M. argued on appeal that the district court erred in granting Bell Bank’s petition. He claimed the merger of assets from the first trust to the second trust was invalid. E.M. also claimed the trust designated E.M. and his siblings as the only beneficiaries, entitling them to share in the trust assets, and entitling E.M. to recover attorney’s fees. Bell Bank and Matthew Tharaldson argued collateral estoppel barred relitigation of E.M.’s claims in this case because of the district court’s findings about E.M.’s status as an heir in the Tharaldson probate case. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court’s order denying E.M.’s demand for change of judge should have been granted, making the assigned judge's actions with respect to the merits of E.M.'s claims invalid. This case was remanded for assignment of a new judge and for proceedings anew on the merits of the petition. View "Matter of Michael J. Tharaldson Trust" on Justia Law

J.H. appealed a trial court's order and findings of fact denying his petition to remove T.F. as guardian of M.H., appoint himself as guardian, and remove contact restrictions T.F. placed on his contact with M.H. On appeal, J.H. argued the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to remove T.F. as guardian and refusing to remove restrictions T.F. placed on his contact with M.H, arguing the finding that he was unable to civilly structure his contact with M.H. was clearly erroneous. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering T.F. remain M.H.’s guardian and its findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Guardianship of M.H." on Justia Law

Henry H. Behle IV appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Darren Harr as the personal representative of the Estate of Henry L. Behle. The district court held Behle’s claims against the Estate concerning two parcels of real estate were untimely under N.D.C.C. 30.1-19-03(2), which barred certain claims that were not brought within three months of a decedent’s death. The court also held Behle’s claim to personal property was barred by the six-year statute of limitations for conversion under N.D.C.C. 28-01-16. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Behle v. Harr" on Justia Law

A.S. appealed a juvenile court's judgment and order terminating her parental rights to her child, A.S.F. A.S. was appointed counsel when the State petitioned for involuntary termination of her parental rights. The trial court allowed A.S.’s counsel to withdraw after A.S. expressed dissatisfaction with her counsel. The termination hearing was continued and new counsel was appointed. One day before the rescheduled hearing, A.S.’s second counsel moved to withdraw. The judge heard the motion at the termination hearing. There, counsel stated a material breakdown in the attorney-client relationship had occurred. The court granted counsel’s motion on the basis of the treatment A.S. showed to her counsel and the unwillingness of A.S. to work with any attorney the court appointed. The judge found A.S.’s actions to be a voluntary waiver of her right to counsel. Counsel was allowed to leave the courtroom. The hearing proceeded with A.S. without counsel. The juvenile court entered an order terminating parental rights on June 10, 2021. A.S. appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court 61 days after the initial June 10 order terminating her parental rights was entered. A.S. argues her right to counsel was violated after the court granted her second attorney’s motion to withdraw, leaving A.S. to represent herself at the termination hearing and without advice regarding the process and deadline for appeal. The Supreme Court determined it lacked jurisdiction even to consider a claim that a party failed to timely appeal as a result of a denial of the party’s right to counsel. "We are without jurisdiction to hear A.S.’s waiver of her right to counsel argument because her appeal was untimely." View "Interest of A.S.F." on Justia Law

Tonya Kerzmann appealed a district court’s denial of her request for an evidentiary hearing on her motion for a change in primary residential responsibility. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Kerzmann pled a prima facie case supporting her motion for modification of primary residential responsibility. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kerzmann v. Kerzmann" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Galvanizers, Inc., and K and K Construction and Repair, Inc., appealed the dismissal of their action against Paul Kautzman seeking to quiet title to real property. Plaintiffs argued the district court erred in dismissing their quiet title action and failed to make sufficient findings to understand the evidentiary and theoretical basis for its decision. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the court’s findings were sufficient to support its decision dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint. View "Galvanizers, et al. v. Kautzman, et al." on Justia Law

Phillip Armstrong appealed a judgment adjudicating ownership of interests in an oil and gas lease and the parties’ claims to revenue proceeds from production on those interests. Continental Resources operated wells located on lands covered by the lease. When Continental learned of competing claims to the leasehold interests in question, it began holding production royalties in suspense and recouping amounts it had paid on the wells. Continental sued Armstrong alleging it had overpaid him. Continental later amended its complaint to add the other defendants and request interpleader relief. Continental requested the district court determine ownership of the interests and the amount of revenue proceeds to which each defendant was entitled on production from wells the parties referred to as the Hartman Wells. The defendants filed various crossclaims and counterclaims. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment to the extent it determined ownership of the disputed interests and dismissed Armstrong’s claims against Continental Resources. The Court reversed and vacated the judgment to the extent it ordered Armstrong to pay Citation 2002 Investment Limited Partnership restitution for unjust enrichment. View "Continental Resources v. Armstrong, et al." on Justia Law

Continental Resources, Inc. (“Continental”) appeals from a district court amended order denying its motion to intervene in this proceeding. P&P Industries, LLC I (“P&P”), a foreign limited liability company, initially obtained a certificate of authority to transact business in North Dakota as a foreign limited liability company in December 2012. Richard Manning was the managing member of the LLC. In 2015, the North Dakota Secretary of State revoked the certificate of authority of P&P as a result of P&P’s failure to file its annual report. In 2020, Manning (represented by counsel) petitioned for reinstatement. The Secretary of State admitted service of the petition, waived the right to any further notice, and consented to the immediate reinstatement of P&P. After reviewing the petition and exhibits, the court entered an order for reinstatement. In May 2020, Continental moved the district court to intervene in this matter and to vacate the reinstatement order. Continental sought to intervene as a matter of right and asserted the district court’s reinstatement order was void. Continental asserted Manning filed the petition to defeat its motion to dismiss P&P’s counterclaims in a pending matter on remand in Williams County district court. After an October 2020 hearing, the district court entered an order denying Continental’s amended motion to intervene and refusing to consider its request to vacate the order for reinstatement. In its order denying intervention, the court held Continental’s claimed interest in this proceeding derived from the motion to dismiss it filed in the separate pending lawsuit. The court rejected Continental’s argument that it had a right to intervene in this proceeding merely because the court’s prior reinstatement order affected an argument Continental was asserting in the separate action. The court concluded this was not a legally protectable interest in the appeal for reinstatement. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded We conclude the district court did not err in denying Continental’s amended motion to intervene. Furthermore, the Court declined Continental’s request for it to exercise its supervisory authority to direct the district court to vacate its prior order for reinstatement. View "Manning v. Jaeger, et al." on Justia Law

Steve and Russell Hartman, as personal representatives of the estate of Ray Hartman (the “Estate”), appealed an amended judgment entered after a bench trial. The Estate argued Ray lacked the capacity to contract, no valid contract for the sale of his farmstead and farmland existed, Trent Grager owed rent for the 2017 farming season, and Ray did not gift a tractor to Grager. Grager cross-appealed, arguing he was entitled to compensation for the Estate’s wrongful occupation of the farm. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed in part, concluding the district court did not err in finding Ray was capable of contracting, the 2016 agreement was a valid contract for the sale of the farmstead and farmland, Grager had no obligation to pay rent in 2017, and the tractor was gifted. The Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding the 2017 document did not supplement or alter the terms of the 2016 agreement, and Grager was entitled to compensation for the Estate’s wrongful occupation of the farm. The case was remanded for the court to determine Grager’s damages for the Estate’s wrongful occupation. View "Hartman, et al. v. Grager" on Justia Law