Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Russell Jones was injured in a work-related auto accident, sustaining an acute lumbar disc herniation with underlying degenerative spinal changes. Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) accepted his claim for the herniation but denied coverage for the preexisting degenerative condition. Jones initially challenged only the denial of a left lower leg injury, a dispute resolved by an administrative law judge (ALJ) who upheld the denial. WSI continued paying benefits for the herniation until a subsequent medical review indicated that the acute injury had resolved, prompting WSI to terminate all lumbar benefits. Jones then argued that his work injury had accelerated his preexisting condition and sought continued benefits on that basis.After a hearing, an ALJ found in Jones’s favor, concluding that his work injury had substantially accelerated his preexisting condition. WSI appealed to the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, contending that Jones’s acceleration claim was barred by administrative res judicata because it could have been raised in the earlier proceeding concerning his left lower leg. The district court agreed with WSI, holding that res judicata precluded Jones from raising the acceleration claim and reversing the ALJ’s decision on that basis, without addressing the merits of the case.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and held that administrative res judicata did not bar Jones’s acceleration claim. The Court reasoned that the acceleration issue did not become a justiciable controversy until WSI terminated benefits for the acute herniation, and Jones was not required to anticipate or litigate that issue before then. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits of Jones’s claim. View "WSI v. Jones" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on two business partners, Hofer and Paulson, who jointly owned multiple entities, including Imaging Solutions, Inc. (ISI). After several ventures failed, both partners assumed significant individual debts to ISI. In 2016, as Paulson sought to separate his interests, the parties negotiated a "Takeout" through their chief financial officer, Heier. Hofer agreed to assume Paulson’s $1.9 million debt to ISI. Multiple agreements were executed, including an oral assumption agreement, a Master Redemption Agreement, and an ISI Redemption Agreement. Hofer later claimed he was unaware of assuming the debt, citing written assumption agreements with stamped signatures that he alleged were unauthorized.The District Court of Cass County held a bench trial in November 2024. It found the oral assumption agreement valid and enforceable, concluding Hofer had indeed assumed Paulson’s debt as part of the Takeout. The court declared the written assumption agreements invalid, dismissed Hofer’s claims for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, rescission, and other causes of action, and awarded statutory costs to Paulson and Heier. Paulson’s counterclaims, other than the request for declaratory judgment, were also dismissed.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal and applied a clearly erroneous standard to factual findings. It held the oral assumption agreement was not subject to the statute of frauds under N.D.C.C. § 9-06-04(2) or (5), because the agreement constituted an assumption rather than a guaranty and did not alter terms of repayment. The court found sufficient evidence of mutual consent and affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the validity and enforceability of the oral assumption agreement. View "Hofer v. Paulson" on Justia Law

Sanderson filed a lawsuit against two individuals employed as Clerk and Deputy Clerk of the Walsh County District Court, alleging they violated state law by failing to take and file an oath of office. He claimed entitlement to various remedies, including forfeiture of their bonds, removal from office, invalidation of their official acts, damages, and injunctive relief. Sanderson based his arguments on several constitutional and statutory provisions, contending that these employees were required to take an oath as civil officers or as members of the judicial branch.The Northeast Judicial District Court, Walsh County, considered the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. The court determined that the statutes Sanderson cited did not apply to district court clerks who are employees of the unified judicial system, as they are neither elected officials nor appointed by elected officials, and thus are not “civil officers” under the relevant legal definitions. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants, finding the complaint frivolous due to a complete lack of factual or legal basis.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that none of the constitutional or statutory provisions cited by Sanderson required unelected, unappointed employees of the unified judicial system to take and file an oath of office. The Supreme Court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the claim was frivolous and in awarding attorney’s fees to the defendants. The judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "Sanderson v. Demers" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with three counts of disobedience of a judicial order, a class A misdemeanor, after allegedly making a prohibited phone call to an individual named Jane Doe while in custody. At the time, he was subject to bail orders in three underlying criminal cases, each including a no-contact provision with Jane Doe. The State alleged that this contact violated the terms of these bail orders.The defendant moved to dismiss the charges on constitutional and statutory grounds, including double jeopardy and due process. The State opposed the motion, arguing that the defendant’s conduct violated the relevant statute. After a hearing, the District Court for Ward County, North Central Judicial District, dismissed the charges without prejudice. The court found there was no probable cause to believe the defendant committed disobedience of a judicial order under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1), holding that the bail orders in question were not the types of orders punishable under that statute. The court did not reach the defendant’s constitutional arguments, finding them moot.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court erred in its statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that predispositional bail orders prohibiting contact are not “temporary restraining orders,” “preliminary or final injunctions,” or “other final orders” within the meaning of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05(1). The court found the statute was intended to address violations of “major” civil orders and not bail conditions imposed as part of a criminal proceeding. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the order dismissing the charges. View "State v. Ferrell" on Justia Law

Donna Berger and Eugene Berger divorced in 2022 after entering a stipulated marital dissolution agreement. The agreement required Donna Berger to make property equalization payments to Eugene Berger through her North Dakota Public Employees Retirement System pension, with specific monthly amounts over a twenty-year period. Because NDPERS could not accommodate the payment structure, Donna Berger arranged alternative direct payments. Eugene Berger later sought to modify the property distribution, asking the court to change the payment amounts and structure, while Donna Berger argued her alternative arrangement complied with the judgment.The District Court of Morton County, South Central Judicial District, first reviewed Eugene Berger’s motion to modify the property distribution in July 2024. The court found that Donna Berger had complied with the judgment by establishing direct deposit forms from NDPERS to Eugene Berger and denied Eugene Berger’s motion. He did not appeal this decision. In March 2025, Eugene Berger filed a new motion to compel compliance with the judgment, arguing the alternative payment arrangement was insufficient because it lacked irrevocable payments. The case was reassigned to a new judge, who found the motion to compel was not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel and granted the motion, ruling Donna Berger had not complied because the payments were revocable. The court also denied Donna Berger’s request for attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the appeal. It held that res judicata barred the district court from considering Eugene Berger’s motion to compel, as the issue of compliance with the judgment had been conclusively resolved in the earlier proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order granting the motion to compel and remanded for the district court to reconsider Donna Berger’s request for attorney’s fees. View "Berger v. Berger" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with criminal vehicular homicide after driving under the influence of alcohol and causing the death of his passenger, who drowned following a crash into a river. The prosecution first amended the charge to manslaughter and then to negligent homicide, a class C felony, to which the defendant pleaded guilty. Both parties agreed on the essential facts supporting the plea. The court ordered a presentence investigation and notified the parties that the applicability of the presumptive probation statute would be discussed at sentencing.In Ward County District Court, the defendant argued that the presumptive probation statute required a sentence of probation because no enumerated exceptions applied. The prosecution contended that aggravating factors justified a departure: that the defendant was in a position of responsibility or trust over the victim and that the victim was vulnerable due to alcohol consumption. The district court found both aggravating factors present, sentenced the defendant to serve one year in prison (with additional suspended and supervised probation), and entered judgment accordingly. The defendant appealed, challenging the legal basis and evidentiary support for the aggravating factors.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court acted within the statutory limits of the presumptive probation statute. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in concluding that either aggravating factor applied. It found that simply being the driver did not establish a position of responsibility or trust under the statute, and the record did not support the conclusion that the victim’s age and vulnerability constituted an aggravating factor, especially in the absence of evidence regarding the victim’s incapacity. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment, vacated the imprisonment sentence, and remanded for resentencing and entry of an amended judgment consistent with its opinion, directing the defendant’s immediate release pending resentencing. View "State v. Rademacher" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was alleged to have sexually assaulted a woman near the Red River in Fargo, North Dakota. The prosecution charged him with gross sexual imposition (GSI) by sexual contact, attempted GSI by sexual act, felonious restraint, and preventing arrest. At trial, the victim testified that the defendant forced her to the ground, pulled down her pants, and attempted but failed to penetrate her anus, while also engaging in other sexual contact. The jury was instructed to unanimously agree on the specific acts underlying each charge but was not required to specify which acts supported each conviction. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts.Following the verdict, the District Court of Cass County sentenced the defendant to concurrent 20-year terms for GSI and attempted GSI, along with additional time for the other convictions. The defendant objected to being sentenced on both GSI and attempted GSI, arguing this constituted double jeopardy because both charges stemmed from the same criminal conduct. The court also declined to award good time credit for pretrial detention, reasoning that the defendant’s conduct while in jail did not merit such credit.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the double jeopardy clause was violated and whether the defendant was entitled to good time credit for pretrial detention. The court held that imposing sentences for both GSI and attempted GSI violated the prohibition against double jeopardy, as the convictions could have been based on the same act, and the attempt merged into the completed offense. However, the court held that the defendant was not eligible for good time credit before sentencing. As a result, the Supreme Court of North Dakota vacated the sentence for attempted GSI and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "State v. Baker" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were married in 2013 and separated in 2023, sharing three school-age children. The marital home, located on the husband’s family farmstead in Pleasant Lake, North Dakota, was occupied by the wife and children after separation, while the husband moved to Rugby, North Dakota. The wife initiated divorce proceedings seeking primary residential responsibility for the children, and the husband counterclaimed for either primary or equal residential responsibility. Both parties submitted proposed parenting plans, with the husband also presenting an alternative plan for extended summer parenting time in the event he was not awarded primary responsibility. The husband additionally sought the marital home, proposing alternative asset distributions.After a bench trial, the District Court of Benson County awarded the wife primary residential responsibility, denied the husband extended summer parenting time, and awarded the marital home to the wife without detailed explanation. The husband appealed. In a prior decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, instructing the district court to provide a reasoned explanation for its decisions on residential responsibility, parenting time, and property distribution. On remand, the district court supplemented its findings but again awarded primary residential responsibility and the marital home to the wife and denied extended summer parenting time, offering explanations that the Supreme Court found inconsistent and insufficient.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court failed to adequately follow its prior mandate, as the supplemental findings were inconsistent with earlier findings and lacked specific explanations for key decisions, especially regarding summer parenting time and the marital home’s distribution. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings before a different judge, directing the new judge to provide detailed findings on residential responsibility, summer parenting time, and property distribution, and to promptly address proposals for extended summer parenting time. View "Shively v. Shively" on Justia Law

A group of affiliated energy companies brought a civil case in North Dakota against several environmental organizations and individuals, alleging a coordinated campaign—sometimes involving unlawful acts—targeted at their pipeline operations. After six years of litigation, a three-week jury trial resulted in a unanimous verdict for the energy companies, awarding over $130 million in compensatory and exemplary damages against one defendant, Greenpeace International, and over $666 million against all Greenpeace entities combined. The jury found Greenpeace International liable for conspiracy, defamation, defamation per se, and tortious interference, but not for property-related torts.While the North Dakota case was pending, Greenpeace International initiated legal proceedings in the Netherlands, seeking relief under Dutch and European anti-SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) laws. The Dutch action alleged, among other things, that the North Dakota suit was a SLAPP case and sought to declare it “manifestly unfounded,” potentially undermining the North Dakota verdict. The energy companies sought an antisuit injunction in North Dakota District Court to prevent Greenpeace International from proceeding with the Dutch litigation. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the Dutch and North Dakota cases involved different issues because anti-SLAPP actions are not recognized under North Dakota law, and thus did not meet the threshold for an antisuit injunction. The district court also found that the Dutch action was not vexatious, did not threaten North Dakota policy, and did not implicate comity concerns.On review, the Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that the district court abused its discretion by misapplying the legal framework for antisuit injunctions. The Supreme Court held that the issues in both cases were substantially similar, as the Dutch action, as pleaded, would require relitigating questions already decided by the North Dakota jury. The Court adopted a “conservative” approach to comity, weighing respect for foreign tribunals against the need to protect the integrity of state proceedings. The Supreme Court granted the petition for a supervisory writ and remanded the case, directing the district court to enter a narrowly tailored antisuit injunction preventing Greenpeace International from pursuing any Dutch claims that would require a finding that the North Dakota case lacked legal foundation, while permitting claims based on matters not adjudicated in North Dakota. View "Energy Transfer v. Gion" on Justia Law

A dispute arose regarding ownership of surface and mineral interests along the Yellowstone River near the North Dakota-Montana border. The land in question included two areas known as the “North Island” and the “West Bank.” Whiting Oil and Gas Corporation, a well operator, initiated an interpleader action to determine the rightful owners of oil and gas interests. The State of North Dakota later filed a quiet title action to adjudicate ownership of the same lands, including surface rights. The parties stipulated to the location of the ordinary high water mark and provided evidence about how the disputed lands were formed, focusing on whether their formation resulted from gradual accretion or sudden avulsive events.The District Court of McKenzie County bifurcated the proceedings. After trial, the court found the Yellowstone River was navigable at statehood. The court determined the State did not own the North Island, concluding it was formed by an avulsive event that separated farmland from the shore, not by accretion in the riverbed. The court initially determined the State owned the West Bank as it had formed as an in-channel island that later attached to the west bank. On summary judgment, however, the district court ruled that a 1950 deed from the State to Norby conveyed the West Bank, interpreting the lots’ western boundary to be the state line rather than the river. The court rejected defenses of laches and statute of limitations.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the district court’s finding that the North Island formed by avulsion was not clearly erroneous and affirmed that the State does not own the North Island. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the West Bank was never part of the government lots conveyed by the State’s deed, so the State retains ownership of the West Bank. The judgment was affirmed in part as to the North Island and reversed in part as to the West Bank. View "State v. Leland" on Justia Law