Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Mary Roth and Aric Roth filed a lawsuit against Gary Meyer and other members of the Meyer family, including trustees of the Jean L. Ehrmantrout Residuary Trust, seeking to quiet title to a 10-acre property in Grant County, North Dakota. Gary Meyer had lived on the property since 1962 and believed he owned it, despite a 1982 conveyance to Dolores Meyer’s father, Anthony Ehrmantrout. Gary and Mary Roth cohabitated on the property from 2002 to 2022, during which time Gary conveyed his interest to Mary via quitclaim deed in 2010, and she later conveyed it to her son, Aric.The District Court of Grant County initially found that Gary Meyer had gained title to the property through adverse possession and quieted title in favor of Aric Roth. The court also ordered Gary Meyer to pay Mary Roth $52,500 for loans she had made to him, finding unjust enrichment. The Meyers appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its findings on adverse possession and unjust enrichment.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s finding of unjust enrichment, agreeing that Gary Meyer was enriched by the loans and had not repaid them, thus impoverishing Mary Roth. However, the Supreme Court found that the district court erred in its adverse possession analysis. The court noted that adverse possession requires clear and convincing evidence of actual, visible, continuous, notorious, distinct, and hostile possession for 20 years. The court found the district court’s findings insufficient to establish hostile possession, particularly given the family relationship and lack of evidence of hostile acts.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment on unjust enrichment but reversed the decision to quiet title in favor of Aric Roth. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "Roth v. Meyer" on Justia Law

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KJ Carpenter purchased a vacant lot in a development governed by a Declaration of Restrictions and Obligations (DRO) that required all building plans to be approved by the Architectural Review Committee (Committee). Carpenter initially submitted a building proposal with asphalt shingles, which was approved. Later, he submitted an amended plan requesting a full metal roof, which was denied based on the restrictive covenant limiting roofing materials to cedar shakes, cedar shingles, or earth-toned colored shingles.Carpenter filed a lawsuit seeking court approval to construct a home with a full metal roof, arguing that the Committee had previously approved metal roofing for other houses, thereby waiving the restrictive covenant. He also contended that the "no waiver" clause in the DRO did not apply because the Committee's prior approvals were not in response to breaches.The District Court of Burleigh County granted summary judgment in favor of Southbay Homeowners Association, holding that Carpenter failed to raise any genuine issues of material fact. The court found that the restrictive covenant was clear and unambiguous, and the "no waiver" clause allowed the Committee to approve metal roofs for other properties while denying Carpenter's request.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that the "no waiver" clause precluded Carpenter from claiming a waiver of the restrictive covenant. The court held that the Committee's approval of partial metal roofs did not constitute a breach, but the two homes with full metal roofs were in violation of the DRO. The court concluded that Carpenter did not demonstrate a clear intent to waive both the restrictive covenant and the "no waiver" clause, and thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment. Southbay's request for costs and attorney's fees was denied. View "Carpenter v. Southbay Homeowners Association" on Justia Law

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Hope Marie Landsberger was found guilty of providing false information to law enforcement. She reported that Nathan Vetter, with whom she shares custody of their infant child, returned the child with a mouth injury and refused to explain how it occurred. However, a recording of the exchange showed that Landsberger did not speak to Vetter during the exchange, contradicting her claims. Additionally, Vetter had previously explained a different incident involving their child, to which Landsberger had acknowledged. The officer noted that Landsberger's report misled law enforcement and that she had a history of filing unfounded police reports against Vetter.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, held a jury trial where Landsberger was found guilty of willfully giving false information to a law enforcement officer in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-11-03(1). Landsberger appealed, arguing that the district court erred by not instructing the jury on the essential elements of the offense with sufficient specificity.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the jury instructions provided by the district court were correct and adequately informed the jury of the applicable law. The instructions specified the date, location, and all elements of the offense as required by the statute. The court found that Landsberger's requested modifications to the jury instructions would have added elements not required by the statute and increased the State's burden of proof. The court concluded that the instructions, taken as a whole, were not erroneous and did not affect a substantial right of the defendant. Therefore, the conviction was upheld. View "State v. Landsberger" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Christopher Gum filed a complaint against Muddy Boyz Drywall LLC in May 2024. Muddy Boyz responded with an answer and counterclaims for conversion, breach of contract, fraud, and trespass. Muddy Boyz subsequently moved for summary judgment to dismiss Gum's claims. The district court granted Muddy Boyz's motion and dismissed Gum's claims on the merits.Gum appealed the district court's judgment, arguing that there were genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The court noted that the district court had not entered a final judgment resolving all the parties' claims, as Muddy Boyz's counterclaims were still pending and there was no certification under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b).The North Dakota Supreme Court held that without a final judgment or proper Rule 54(b) certification, there is no right to appeal. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Gum v. Muddy Boyz Drywall" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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Mackenzie Pennington and Casey Weber, who married in 2011, have two children. In 2020, Weber initiated a divorce, and in 2021, the district court's judgment incorporated their settlement agreement, granting them equal and shared parenting responsibility with joint legal and alternating weekly physical custody. Pennington was required to exercise her parenting time in New Rockford during the school year due to the children's school location.In November 2021, Pennington moved for primary residential responsibility, citing the impracticality of the parenting schedule due to travel distance. The district court denied her motion and granted Weber's request for primary residential responsibility, modifying the parenting plan to allow Pennington parenting time on alternating weekends during the school year. In September 2024, Pennington again sought primary residential responsibility, alleging Weber's failure to meet the children's medical and educational needs. The district court denied her motion, concluding she did not demonstrate a prima facie case of a material change in circumstances adversely affecting the children.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Pennington failed to establish a prima facie case for modification of primary residential responsibility. The court noted that Pennington's complaints about Weber's parenting did not demonstrate a material change in circumstances that adversely affected the children or resulted in a general decline in their condition. The court also clarified that the standard for determining a material change in circumstances does not require evidence that the children are "suffering," but rather that the change has adversely affected them or resulted in a general decline in their condition. View "Weber v. Pennington" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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Garron Gonzalez pled guilty in 2004 to two counts of gross sexual imposition and was sentenced to five years on each count, concurrently, with most of the sentence suspended for probation. His probation was revoked in 2005, and he was resentenced to five years on each count, concurrently, with part of the sentence suspended. In 2011, his probation was revoked again, and he was resentenced to 20 years on each count, consecutively. In 2013, a postconviction relief application led to a new revocation hearing, and in 2014, he was resentenced to 20 years on each count, concurrently. In 2023, another postconviction relief application resulted in a resentencing to five years on each count, consecutively. This was reversed on appeal, and in February 2024, he was resentenced to five years on each count, concurrently, with credit for time served.Gonzalez filed a postconviction relief application in May 2024, arguing that his 2005 sentence was illegal and that his credit for time served was incorrect. The State opposed his application. Gonzalez waived the postconviction hearing, and after submitting a closing brief, the district court denied his application, concluding he failed to show his sentence was illegal or that his credit for time served was incorrect.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and considered the issue of mootness. The court noted that Gonzalez had completed his sentence under the 2024 judgment, which rendered his arguments about the 2005 sentence and credit for time served moot. The court concluded that any collateral consequences Gonzalez claimed were speculative and would not be remedied by a favorable ruling. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as moot. View "Gonzalez v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In October 2023, a truck was stolen from a shop in Burleigh County, North Dakota. Surveillance video captured images of an individual at the shop, and shortly thereafter, the truck was driven away without permission. The next morning, the truck was found engulfed in flames with a rag in the fuel port. Jason Allen Leingang was observed wearing clothing identical to the individual in the surveillance video shortly after the truck was discovered.Leingang was charged with theft of property over $50,000, a class A felony. During a preliminary hearing in December 2023, a Bismarck Police Department officer testified about the original surveillance video, which was not preserved. Only two brief video clips were available, showing an individual walking through the parking lot and the truck leaving. In February 2024, Leingang filed a motion to suppress testimony related to the surveillance video, which the district court denied. During the May 2024 trial, Leingang objected again to the admission of the testimony, but the objection was overruled, and the video clips were admitted into evidence. The jury found Leingang guilty.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. Leingang argued that the district court erred in admitting the two video clips and the testimony about the entire surveillance video. The Supreme Court noted that Leingang did not object to the video clips at trial and did not argue obvious error on appeal. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony about the entire surveillance video under Rule 1004(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, as the original video was lost without bad faith by the state. The Supreme Court affirmed the criminal judgment. View "State v. Leingang" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In May 2023, Daedyn Lewellyn was charged with terrorizing. His trial was initially scheduled for September 2023, but his court-appointed attorney retired, leading to multiple changes in representation. Lewellyn requested and was granted a continuance to review discovery, rescheduling the trial to January 2024. He later sought to change his plea but expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney, leading to further changes in representation. By August 2024, Lewellyn had gone through six court-appointed attorneys, with the last few withdrawing due to conflicts or deteriorated attorney-client relationships. On the eve of trial, Lewellyn dismissed his latest attorney and requested a continuance and new counsel, which the court denied.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, presided over by Judge Cynthia M. Feland, handled the initial proceedings. The court granted several continuances due to changes in Lewellyn’s representation and scheduling conflicts. However, when Lewellyn dismissed his attorney the day before the trial, the court denied his request for another continuance and new counsel, citing the case's age and multiple previous continuances.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that Lewellyn’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated. It determined that Lewellyn’s conduct amounted to a voluntary waiver of his right to counsel, as he was repeatedly informed that no further substitute counsel would be appointed. The court also found that Lewellyn’s waiver was knowing and intelligent, given his understanding of the risks of self-representation. Additionally, the court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance request, considering the case's age and the numerous previous continuances. The Supreme Court affirmed the criminal judgment. View "State v. Lewellyn" on Justia Law

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Jacob Severson sought treatment from Dr. Shabnum Gupta at a Sanford facility in Fargo for the removal of four genital warts using cryotherapy. Following the procedure, Severson experienced blistering and scarring in the genital area and returned to Sanford multiple times for treatment. He later sought mental health support, claiming the procedure caused his issues. Severson also visited a dermatologist for additional warts and was referred to the urology department for a physical abnormality. In January 2024, Severson filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Sanford and Dr. Gupta.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied Severson's motion to amend his complaint. Severson argued that his claim fell under exceptions to the North Dakota Century Code (N.D.C.C.) § 28-01-46, which requires an expert affidavit in medical negligence cases. He claimed his case involved an "obvious occurrence" of negligence, which does not require expert testimony. The district court disagreed, finding that the intricacies of cryotherapy and its potential adverse effects were not within the knowledge of a layperson and that the wrong organ exception did not apply.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Severson's claim did not meet the "obvious occurrence" exception and that he failed to provide the required expert affidavit within three months of commencing the lawsuit. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Severson's motion to amend his complaint to allege medical battery, as the amendment would have been futile based on the existing record. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Severson v. Gupta" on Justia Law

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The case involves a divorce action between Tami Van Beek and Darrell Van Beek, who married in June 2007 and have three children. During the trial, both parties provided testimony and exhibits, and the court also received testimony from their children, school administrators, and Darrell's parents. The district court divided the marital estate, awarding Tami farmland and an equity payment of $700,000, while Darrell received crops, land rent, and vehicles. Tami was granted primary residential responsibility and child support based on Darrell's income of $48,000 per year. Tami was also awarded attorney’s fees.The district court's decisions were challenged by Darrell on several grounds, including the valuation and distribution of the marital estate, the exclusion of his insurance agent's testimony, the award of primary residential responsibility to Tami, the calculation of his child support obligation, and the award of attorney’s fees. The district court's distribution of marital property was reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, and the court's findings were generally upheld, except for the inclusion of potential income of $198,823 in the marital estate, which was reversed and remanded for reconsideration.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case. The court held that the district court erred in including the potential income of $198,823 in the marital estate and remanded for reconsideration of the allocation of the existing marital estate. The court also remanded for consideration of whether an award of attorney’s fees and costs with respect to the appeal would result in financial hardship to Darrell and, if appropriate, the amount of any award. The court affirmed the district court's decisions regarding the distribution of marital property, the exclusion of the insurance agent's testimony, the award of primary residential responsibility, and the calculation of child support. View "Van Beek v. Van Beek" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law