Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Torrey Kath brought a personal injury lawsuit against Michael Prochnow and Prochnow Farms, alleging that Prochnow moved a semi-truck while Kath was underneath, causing significant injury. Kath and Prochnow entered into a Miller-Shugart agreement, where Prochnow accepted damages, and Kath agreed to collect solely from Prochnow’s insurers. The case was dismissed with prejudice after a stipulation of dismissal was filed.Kath then filed a declaratory judgment action against Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company (FUMIC), which insured Prochnow under a farm liability policy. Kath sought declarations that the policy covered his injuries and that the Miller-Shugart agreement was reasonable and binding on FUMIC. The District Court of Stutsman County granted Kath summary judgment on the coverage issue, interpreting the policy’s motor vehicle exclusion as not applying to the coverage added by a farm employer liability endorsement.FUMIC moved for summary judgment, arguing it had no duty to indemnify Prochnow because the personal injury action had been dismissed with prejudice. While this motion was pending, Kath and Prochnow successfully moved to vacate the dismissal and entered a $2 million judgment against Prochnow, to be paid solely by FUMIC. The district court then denied FUMIC’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the judgment in the personal injury action rendered FUMIC’s motion moot and granted summary judgment in favor of Kath on the second count of his complaint.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the policy’s motor vehicle exclusion applied to Kath’s injuries, and thus, the policy did not provide coverage. The court concluded that the endorsement did not supersede the motor vehicle exclusion and that the policy, when read as a whole, excluded coverage for injuries related to the use of motor vehicles. View "Kath v. Farmers Union Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In December 2021, the Ward’s adult son petitioned for an emergency guardianship, alleging the Ward was incapacitated. The district court denied the ex parte appointment but later appointed the son as the emergency guardian. The Ward and his son stipulated that the Ward required a limited guardian and a conservator, leading to the appointment of Lutheran Social Service of Minnesota (LSS) as the limited guardian and First Western Bank as the conservator. The limited guardianship was set for one year, and the conservatorship for five years.Before the guardianship expired, the district court extended it and reappointed Dr. Swenson as an expert examiner. The Ward petitioned for termination of the guardianship, supported by LSS and the guardian ad litem. At the review hearing, the court presented evidence from Dr. Swenson and others. The court concluded the Ward failed to make a prima facie case for termination and extended the guardianship for two more years. The Ward appealed, and LSS stipulated that the guardianship should be terminated.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in reappointing Dr. Swenson as an expert examiner, as the statute did not authorize such an appointment in termination proceedings. The court concluded that the Ward had established a prima facie case for termination and that there was no clear and convincing evidence showing the Ward remained incapacitated. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and terminated the limited guardianship. View "Guardianship and Conservatorship of K.H.P." on Justia Law

In May 2020, Daniel Samaniego was charged with gross sexual imposition, a class AA felony. During his trial in May 2021, a detective testified about attempting to interview Samaniego, leading to an objection from Samaniego’s counsel, which was sustained. The jury found Samaniego guilty. Post-trial, a juror indicated that the jury discussed Samaniego’s decision not to testify. Samaniego’s counsel did not move for a new trial based on this potential jury misconduct.Samaniego appealed the criminal judgment in September 2021, arguing insufficient evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, noting the prosecutorial misconduct claim was not preserved for appeal. In May 2023, Samaniego filed for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not preserving the prosecutorial misconduct issue and not moving for a new trial based on jury misconduct. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the application in February 2024.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Samaniego did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have been different but for his counsel’s alleged errors. The court found no prosecutorial misconduct in the detective’s testimony and noted that the jury’s discussion about Samaniego not testifying did not constitute juror misconduct under the law. The court concluded that Samaniego’s trial counsel’s actions did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and that Samaniego was not prejudiced by these actions. View "Samaniego v. State" on Justia Law

Thomas Roller was charged with multiple offenses, including terrorizing an adult victim, reckless endangerment, criminal mischief, unauthorized use of a vehicle, and domestic violence. The unauthorized use of a vehicle charge was dismissed before trial. The jury found Roller guilty of the remaining charges. Roller contested the jury instruction on criminal mischief, arguing it allowed for a non-cognizable offense, and also challenged his sentence as a habitual offender, claiming the court improperly considered his prior convictions.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, presided over the trial. The jury instructions defined criminal mischief as willfully damaging property and intentionally causing pecuniary loss over $100. Roller did not object to these instructions during the trial. The jury convicted Roller on all counts. At the presentencing hearing, the court took judicial notice of Roller’s prior convictions, despite his initial objection, which he later withdrew. The court found Roller met the criteria for habitual offender status and sentenced him accordingly.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the jury instructions did not constitute obvious error, as the terms "willfully" and "intentionally" were not legally incongruent. The court also found that the district court did not err in taking judicial notice of Roller’s prior convictions for sentencing purposes, as the rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing procedures. The court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion and did not impose an illegal sentence. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "State v. Roller" on Justia Law

Liberty Petroleum Corporation appealed a judgment affirming North Dakota Industrial Commission (NDIC) orders approving a plan of unitization for the Haystack Butte (Bakken Pool) Unit (HBU) in McKenzie County, North Dakota. Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co. LP petitioned NDIC for unitized management of the HBU, which would allow drilling without regard to spacing unit boundaries. Liberty, holding federal oil and gas leases and working interests in the HBU, objected to the plan, particularly Article 11.8, which provided for the payment of pre-unitization risk penalty balances from unit production proceeds. Liberty argued this would unfairly take revenue from wells it participated in to satisfy penalties on non-consent wells.The District Court of McKenzie County affirmed NDIC's orders, finding that the plan of unitization was in the public interest, protective of correlative rights, and necessary to increase oil and gas recovery and prevent waste. NDIC concluded that production from the unit area would be distributed to each tract within the unit area, regardless of where it was produced, and rejected Liberty's objections to Article 11.8.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the lower court's decision. The Court found that NDIC did not exceed its authority, misapply the law, or authorize an unconstitutional taking. It held that NDIC's approval of Article 11.8 was consistent with the unitization statutes, which allow for the recovery of risk penalties from unit production. The Court also concluded that NDIC's findings were supported by substantial and credible evidence, including expert testimony from Burlington. The judgment was affirmed, and NDIC's orders were upheld. View "Liberty Petroleum Corp. v. NDIC" on Justia Law

Trent Rolland was involved in a traffic accident with a minor, who later alleged that Rolland had been communicating with her via SnapChat, sending explicit messages and photographs, and had sexual contact with her. Rolland was charged with luring a minor and other related offenses. During his arrest, his smartphone was seized, and he was taken to the Richland County jail, where he was read his Miranda rights and subsequently made several incriminating admissions during an interview. Law enforcement obtained a warrant to search his phone, leading to additional charges.The District Court of Sargent County, Southeast Judicial District, presided over by Judge Nicholas D. Thornton, denied Rolland's motions to suppress evidence and his motion to dismiss based on his competency to stand trial. Rolland had undergone multiple psychological evaluations, with conflicting opinions on his competency. The court overruled Rolland's objection to the timeliness of one of the competency reports and found him competent to stand trial. Rolland entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed the judgment, arguing errors in the competency determination and the denial of his motions to suppress evidence.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court did not provide adequate findings to support its decision on Rolland's competency. The Supreme Court noted that the district court's statements were merely a recitation of the legal standard without explaining the basis for its decision. The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and remanded the case for 60 days for the district court to determine whether Rolland was fit to proceed before entering his conditional guilty plea, based on the record at the time of his motion to dismiss. The district court must conduct an additional competency hearing to assess the evaluators' testimony and credibility. View "State v. Rolland" on Justia Law

Senske Rentals, LLC, owns property in a subdivision affected by a City of Grand Forks improvement project to pave gravel roads and install street lighting. The city council approved a resolution creating a special assessment district for the project, and the City’s special assessment commission assigned benefits to the affected properties based on frontage, sideage, and square footage. Property owners were notified, and public input meetings were held. Despite protests from property owners, including Senske Rentals, the commission approved the special assessments.The district court of Grand Forks County affirmed the city council’s decision to approve the commission’s determination on the special assessments. Senske Rentals appealed, arguing that the commission failed to perform the required benefit analysis under North Dakota law and that the special assessment amounted to an unconstitutional taking. The district court denied Senske’s motions to strike certain documents from the record and to supplement the record, ultimately affirming the city council’s decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the City’s special assessment commission did not properly determine the benefits accruing to Senske’s property as required by N.D.C.C. § 40-23-07. The court held that the statute requires a determination of special benefits independent of, and without regard to, the cost of the improvement project. The court found that the City had conducted a cost allocation rather than an independent determination of benefit, which was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case to the City for a proper determination of special benefits to Senske’s lots, independent of the project’s cost, and to apply that special benefit as a limit on assessments to each of Senske’s lots. View "Senske Rentals v. City of Grand Forks" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Sharon Mitzel, Alan Mitzel, and Eric Mitzel, filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against Vogel Law Firm and Jerilynn Brantner Adams, alleging negligence in a divorce action involving the disposition of land known as Section 19. Fred and Sharon Mitzel, who were married and had two sons, formed a family limited partnership and conveyed their farm, including Section 19, to it. During their divorce, they agreed that Section 19 would go to Fred, subject to deeding it to their sons upon his death. However, a subsequent quiet title action determined that the family partnership owned Section 19, nullifying the divorce judgment's property distribution.The District Court of Cass County granted partial summary judgment dismissing Alan and Eric Mitzel’s claims, ruling they lacked standing as non-clients to sue for legal malpractice. The court also granted judgment as a matter of law dismissing Sharon Mitzel’s claims, concluding she presented no evidence that she gave up any marital property to secure the agreement for Section 19 to be deeded to her sons upon Fred’s death. Sharon Mitzel’s claim for attorney’s fees and costs incurred due to Vogel’s alleged malpractice was also dismissed.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss Alan and Eric Mitzel’s claims, agreeing they lacked standing. The court also upheld the measure of damages used by the lower court, which was based on what Sharon Mitzel gave up to secure Section 19 for her sons. However, the Supreme Court found that the lower court erred in determining Sharon Mitzel presented no evidence of incurring attorney’s fees and costs due to Vogel’s alleged malpractice. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Mitzel v. Vogel Law Firm" on Justia Law

David Gaddie was charged with four counts of gross sexual imposition for allegedly sexually abusing a child. In a separate case, he was charged with three counts of gross sexual imposition for allegedly abusing the child's mother, but those charges were dismissed. The case involving the child proceeded to trial, and Gaddie was found guilty on all counts. On direct appeal, one conviction was reversed due to an issue with jury instructions.Gaddie then filed an application for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The State moved for partial summary dismissal, arguing that Gaddie should have raised the prosecutorial misconduct claim on direct appeal. The district court reserved ruling on this motion and held a hearing. During the hearing, it was revealed that the State had introduced a video containing statements about Gaddie abusing the child's mother, which Gaddie’s attorney had objected to during the trial. The district court denied the State's motion for partial summary dismissal but ultimately denied Gaddie’s application for postconviction relief, reasoning that the situation was a misunderstanding rather than intentional misconduct.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that prosecutorial misconduct had occurred because the State introduced inadmissible prior bad act evidence without providing the required notice under N.D.R.Ev. 404(b). The Court held that this misconduct prejudiced Gaddie’s right to a fair trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment denying postconviction relief and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the criminal judgment and enter any supplementary orders required by law. View "Gaddie v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the sale of real property owned by the estate of Mark Engelhardt. Yvonne Engelhart, the personal representative of the estate, sent a notice letter to interested parties, including the Ebels and Tom Gross, outlining the bidding process for the property. The Ebels submitted bids that complied with the notice letter's requirements, while Gross submitted bids that did not meet the specified conditions. Despite this, the estate's attorney initially declared the Ebels the winning bidders but later accepted Gross's bids after he questioned the process.The District Court of McIntosh County initially dismissed the Ebels' claims, concluding the contracts were invalid due to the statute of frauds. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed this decision, stating the statute of frauds was not properly raised. On remand, the district court declared the contracts between the Ebels and the estate valid and ordered specific performance. The court dismissed the Ebels' tortious interference claims against Gross, finding his actions justified.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that valid contracts were formed between the Ebels and the estate when the estate's attorney declared them the winning bidders. The court found that Gross's bids did not comply with the notice letter's requirements and that he had actual notice of the Ebels' winning bids, disqualifying him as a good-faith purchaser. The court also upheld the dismissal of the Ebels' tortious interference claims, concluding Gross's actions were reasonable and justified under the circumstances. View "Ebel v. Engelhart" on Justia Law