Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves a parent, D.A.D., whose parental rights regarding his child, G.M.H., were challenged following a period of incarceration. D.A.D. and the child’s mother, K.R.H., separated in June 2022. Shortly after, D.A.D. was arrested and later convicted of possessing child pornography, resulting in nearly three years of incarceration. During his imprisonment, D.A.D. made limited attempts to communicate with G.M.H., sending only a few letters and making a small number of phone calls. The divorce judgment provided for supervised parenting time after his release, contingent on D.A.D. providing specific information to K.R.H., which he failed to do.A petition for termination of parental rights and for adoption was filed by K.R.H. and her spouse, D.A.H., in April 2025. The District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, held a hearing and found by clear and convincing evidence that D.A.D. had abandoned G.M.H. and that his conduct, faults, and neglect justified termination of his parental rights. The court cited his lack of meaningful contact and support, both before and during his incarceration, and concluded that there was no reasonable expectation his behavior would change.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its discretionary decision for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s finding of abandonment was supported by the evidence and not clearly erroneous. The court also determined that the statutory definition of abandonment, as applied, did not violate D.A.D.’s constitutional rights, as it required consideration of whether failures to communicate or support were without justifiable cause, including incarceration. The order terminating D.A.D.’s parental rights was affirmed. View "Adoption of G.M.H." on Justia Law

Two minor children, J.C. and S.C.Y., both enrolled members of the Mandan Hidatsa Arikara Nation, were placed in the care of Ward County Human Service Zone after repeated removals due to concerns about their mother, P.D.'s, ability to provide proper care. The children were found to be in need of protection and had spent substantial periods in foster care. The State sought termination of P.D.’s parental rights, alleging persistent issues that endangered the children’s well-being, including P.D.'s instability, incomplete compliance with service plans, ongoing substance abuse, and involvement in criminal activity.The Juvenile Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, reviewed the petitions and held a trial. The court considered testimony from various witnesses and documentary evidence, including progress reports and judicial notice of prior protection proceedings. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of protection, the causes for protection were likely to continue, and the children had suffered harm. The court also found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that returning the children to P.D. would likely cause them serious emotional or physical harm. The court terminated P.D.’s parental rights.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s factual findings and conclusions regarding the need for protection and likelihood of ongoing harm. However, the Supreme Court found that the juvenile court failed to make the required specific findings under N.D.C.C. § 27-19.1-01(2), which mandates detailed findings that “active efforts” were made to provide remedial and rehabilitative services to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and that these efforts were unsuccessful. The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and remanded the case for the juvenile court to make these necessary findings, allowing additional evidence if required. View "Interest of S.C.Y." on Justia Law

Kolstad and Claussen are the unmarried parents of two minor children, having lived together for about four years before separating in early 2024. Claussen also has primary residential responsibility for a child from a previous marriage. After their separation, Kolstad initiated a legal action seeking primary residential responsibility and child support for their two children, while Claussen counterclaimed for the same relief. The district court held a bench trial in October 2024, during which Claussen requested either primary or equal residential responsibility.Following the trial, the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, awarded Kolstad and Claussen equal residential responsibility for their children and ordered Claussen to pay Kolstad $157 per month in child support. The district court found that Claussen’s change in employment was motivated by a desire to parent his children and not to reduce his child support obligation. Kolstad appealed, arguing that the district court failed to make adequate findings regarding two statutory best interest factors: the developmental needs of the children and evidence of domestic violence.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and applied the clearly erroneous standard to the district court’s factual findings. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that Claussen’s employment change was not intended to reduce his child support obligation. However, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment in part, finding that the district court did not make sufficient findings or provide adequate explanation regarding best interest factors (c) (the children’s developmental needs and the parents’ ability to meet those needs) and (j) (evidence of domestic violence). The Supreme Court remanded the case for further findings and clarification on those factors, instructing the district court to explain its reasoning and to clarify whether the statutory presumption regarding domestic violence applies. View "Kolstad v. Claussen" on Justia Law

Fairville Township decided to remove two culvert crossings, known as Crossings 2 and 3, from a township roadway. These culverts had existed prior to construction of the Oak Creek Drain, a flood control project built by the Wells County Water Resource District in the late 1980s, which had incorporated the culverts into its design. After the Township removed the crossings and reconstructed the roadway, the Water District determined that this constituted an obstruction to the drain and would adversely affect local agricultural land and infrastructure. The Water District ordered the Township to reconstruct the crossings, and when the Township did not comply, the District reinstalled the culverts itself.The Water District issued orders to assess the costs of reinstalling the culverts against Fairville Township, citing its statutory authority under N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-51. The District concluded that the Township was responsible for the obstruction and directed Wells County to levy the assessment against the Township. Fairville Township appealed these assessment orders to the District Court of Wells County. After briefing, the district court reversed the Water District’s assessment orders, finding that the statute applied only to private landowners or tenants, not to governing bodies such as townships, and that the Water District’s actions were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s decision under a limited standard, independently considering whether the Water District acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably. The Supreme Court held that N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-51 only authorizes water resource boards to assess costs against the property of a responsible landowner, and the Water District failed to establish that the Township was a landowner or that costs were assessed against its property. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s reversal of the Water District’s assessment orders. View "Fairville Township v. Wells Cty. Water Resource District" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to felony child neglect, the defendant was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment with three years suspended, credit for 375 days already served, supervised probation, and restitution. Following his release, the State alleged that the defendant violated multiple conditions of his probation. At a probation revocation hearing, the defendant waived his right to counsel and admitted the violations, leading the district court to revoke his probation. The court orally stated the defendant would receive credit for two years plus the time he spent in custody after being arrested on the probation violation warrant, which amounted to twenty-four days.The written order issued after the revocation hearing, however, erroneously recorded the credit for time served as “3 years and 34 days” instead of the correct “2 years and 24 days.” The State moved to correct this mistake under North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, arguing it was a clerical error that conflicted with the court’s oral pronouncement. The District Court of McHenry County granted the State’s motion, found the original written order contained a clerical error, and issued an amended order reflecting the proper credit. The defendant appealed, arguing that the correction improperly reduced his credit for time served and conflicted with the court’s oral pronouncement. He also asserted his constitutional right to counsel was violated when the court did not appoint an attorney to represent him in the Rule 36 proceedings.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s orders. It held that the correction was a permissible exercise of the court’s discretion under Rule 36 to remedy a clerical error in the judgment so that it accurately reflected the oral pronouncement at the revocation hearing. The court also concluded that the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel was not violated because the correction of a clerical error under Rule 36 is not a critical stage of the prosecution. View "State v. Jaeger" on Justia Law

William C. Hansen and Verna Hansen, a married couple, established a revocable trust in 1997, with separate shares for each spouse and detailed distribution instructions for each share after their deaths. On the same day, William C. Hansen executed a durable power of attorney naming Verna Hansen as his agent, granting her broad authority over his property. After William C. Hansen’s death in 1999, Verna Hansen, acting as his agent under the power of attorney, amended the trust twice, altering the distribution provisions. Following the deaths of both William and Verna Hansen, a dispute arose between their descendants—on one side, Catherine Hansen Dietemann and her daughter Lauren, and on the other, William Anthony (“Tony”) Hansen—regarding the validity of these amendments and the proper distribution of the trust assets.After Bravera Wealth, the trustee, sought a judicial declaration of beneficiary rights, the District Court of Stark County granted summary judgment in favor of Tony Hansen. The district court concluded that the trust amendments made by Verna Hansen were valid, finding that the broad language in the power of attorney gave her the authority to amend the trust, and that the relevant statutory requirement for express authorization did not apply retroactively. Based on the amended trust terms, the court also applied North Dakota’s antilapse statute to determine the distribution shares among the beneficiaries.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the lower court’s interpretation of North Dakota Century Code § 59-14-02(5), which requires that any powers to amend a trust by an agent under a power of attorney must be expressly stated. The Supreme Court held that the statute applied to this proceeding because it was commenced after July 31, 2007, and that neither the trust nor the power of attorney provided the required express authorization for Verna Hansen to amend the trust. As a result, the court ruled the amendments invalid, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded for distribution according to the original trust terms. View "Matter of Hansen Trust" on Justia Law

An estate dispute arose following the death of Marvin C. Lepp, whose heirs included seven children and four grandchildren. Initially, Murray Lepp and Michael Lepp were appointed co-personal representatives of the estate. Over time, disputes developed between the heirs regarding the management of the estate, including the removal of personal representatives, appointment of a successor, and the handling of a contract for deed concerning estate property. After both co-personal representatives were removed, the district court appointed Dacotah Bank as successor personal representative. Additional litigation involved the cancellation of Murray Lepp’s contract for deed, disputes over rent payments related to estate property, and requests for attorney’s fees.The District Court of McIntosh County, Southeast Judicial District, considered and issued various orders: it removed the co-personal representatives, appointed Dacotah Bank, cancelled Murray Lepp’s contract for deed following summary judgment, denied Murray Lepp’s motions to dismiss and reconsider, resolved some rent disputes, and awarded attorney’s fees to Maureen Lepp. Murray Lepp filed notices of appeal from these orders.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the appeal. It determined that the appeal from the order appointing Dacotah Bank was untimely under the procedural rules. The court further found that, because the estate’s administration was unsupervised and several claims and petitions remained unresolved in the district court, including issues of partial distribution and final accounting, the orders appealed from were not final and appealable absent certification under Rule 54(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. Since no such certification was sought or granted, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Estate of Lepp" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with simple assault following an incident in April 2022. Throughout the proceedings, he was represented by a series of court-appointed attorneys. The first attorney was replaced due to a change in employment. The next two attorneys withdrew, one citing a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and the other a conflict of interest. Each time, a new attorney was appointed. Upon the withdrawal of the fourth appointed attorney, due to a deteriorated attorney-client relationship and the defendant’s insistence on pursuing an unethical defense, the defendant was informed by court order that no further counsel would be provided at public expense. He was served with the withdrawal orders but was not present at every hearing. At a pretrial hearing the day before trial, the defendant again requested appointed counsel, but the court required him to proceed pro se if he had not retained a lawyer by the next day. The defendant represented himself at trial and was convicted.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, presided over the pretrial proceedings, withdrawals, and trial. The court concluded that, given the repeated breakdowns with counsel and explicit orders, the defendant’s conduct constituted the functional equivalent of a voluntary waiver of his right to counsel, and therefore required him to proceed without appointed counsel.Upon review, the Supreme Court of North Dakota found that, although the defendant’s actions amounted to a functional waiver of his right to counsel, the record did not establish that such waiver was made knowingly and intelligently. Specifically, the court noted the absence of a warning or explanation to the defendant regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation prior to his final attorney’s withdrawal. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the defendant’s waiver of counsel was not knowing and intelligent as required by law. View "State v. Hoff" on Justia Law

A driver was involved in a traffic collision in Grand Forks County, North Dakota, which resulted in injuries to two people in another vehicle, including a minor who later died. Law enforcement, led by the North Dakota Highway Patrol, responded to the scene and investigated the driver for driving under the influence. During the investigation, a chemical breath test was administered to the driver to determine his blood alcohol content. The State later charged the driver with criminal vehicular injury and criminal vehicular homicide, both alleging he was driving under the influence.The District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, held an evidentiary hearing on the driver's motion to suppress the results of the chemical breath test. The driver argued that his consent to the test was not voluntary and that the evidence was obtained in violation of statute and his due process rights. The court granted the motion, suppressing the breath test evidence, finding that the State failed to show that the driver voluntarily consented to the chemical test after being read the implied consent advisory.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the District Court’s decision and applied a de novo standard to questions of law, while deferring to the lower court’s factual findings unless they were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the District Court misapplied the law by treating the relevant statutes—N.D.C.C. §§ 39-20-01 and 39-20-01.1—as separate and distinct rather than as statutes that operate in conjunction. The Supreme Court clarified that both statutes may apply simultaneously and that providing an accurate implied consent advisory does not constitute per se coercion. The Court reversed the suppression order and remanded the case for further findings on whether the driver’s consent was voluntary, using the correct legal standards. View "State v. Bell" on Justia Law

Lawrence Harris sought postconviction relief following his criminal conviction, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective and that the State violated its obligations under Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose favorable evidence—specifically, the probation conditions of a witness. Harris claimed that these alleged deficiencies undermined the fairness of his trial and warranted relief from his conviction.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, reviewed Harris’s claims. Applying the standard from Strickland v. Washington, the district court found that Harris failed to demonstrate that any alleged errors by his trial counsel prejudiced the outcome of his case; in other words, he did not show a reasonable probability of a different result but for counsel’s unprofessional errors. Regarding the Brady claim, the court determined that Harris did not provide evidence that the State suppressed the witness’s probation conditions, and thus denied relief on that basis as well.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota considered Harris’s arguments. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of postconviction relief. It held that the lower court’s findings regarding ineffective assistance of counsel were not clearly erroneous and were supported by evidence. Regarding the Brady claim, the Supreme Court concluded that Harris waived the issue by failing to meet the minimum briefing requirements under the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure, as his appellate brief did not adequately articulate or support the claim. As a result, the Supreme Court declined to address the Brady claim on its merits and affirmed the district court’s order denying Harris’s application for postconviction relief. View "Harris v. State" on Justia Law