Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After his employment with a school bus service was terminated, Christopher Bauer initiated a lawsuit in October 2024 against the company and several current and former employees. He alleged claims such as civil conspiracy, constitutional tortious interference, and defamation. The company intervened and moved to dismiss the case, request sanctions, and to have Bauer declared a vexatious litigant. The District Court of Williams County dismissed most claims except for civil conspiracy and defamation, ordered a more definite statement on the surviving claims, and sanctioned Bauer for filing frivolous claims. Though the court initially declined to declare him a vexatious litigant, it warned that continued conduct might warrant such an order. Bauer amended his complaint and continued filing motions.In July 2025, the presiding judge of the Northwest Judicial District, on her own motion, issued a proposed pre-filing order to restrict Bauer’s ability to file new litigation or documents without court approval, finding his litigation tactics vexatious. Bauer was given notice and an opportunity to respond but did not request a hearing. The pre-filing order was entered, and further sanctions were subsequently imposed. Bauer appealed orders denying his motion for default judgment, sanctioning him, and the pre-filing order.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed his appeal. The court dismissed Bauer’s appeal from the denial of default judgment and the sanction order for lack of appellate jurisdiction, as these orders were not appealable. It affirmed the pre-filing order, holding that the presiding judge had jurisdiction and that Bauer received sufficient due process, including notice and an opportunity to respond. It also found the vexatious litigant designation was not an abuse of discretion. The court awarded double costs to all appellees and attorney’s fees of $1,000 to the company for defending against a meritless appeal. View "Bauer v. Adam" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer in Ramsey County, North Dakota, stopped a driver after observing her vehicle cross the center line. The driver, accompanied by her two minor children, exhibited physical signs of nervousness and possible impairment. The officer determined her license was suspended and observed further signs suggesting possible drug use, which included shaking, pacing, and bloodshot, constricted eyes. After the driver admitted to having smoked marijuana earlier in the day, the officer detained her, contacted the children’s parents to pick them up, and requested the assistance of a K-9 unit. Field sobriety tests were conducted, which did not indicate alcohol impairment. When the K-9 arrived, the dog alerted to the presence of drugs, leading to a search of the vehicle that uncovered drug paraphernalia and marijuana.The District Court of Ramsey County denied the defendant’s motion to suppress her statements and the evidence discovered during the stop, finding that the officer did not subject her to unlawful custodial interrogation and that the search of her vehicle was supported by probable cause under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court erred in denying the suppression motion. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not subjected to unlawful custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings at the time she admitted to drug use, the officer did not impermissibly prolong the stop to facilitate the K-9 arrival, and probable cause supported the subsequent vehicle search. The Court further upheld the search of her person at the detention facility as incident to a lawful arrest. The Supreme Court affirmed the amended criminal judgment. View "State v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Richard Marschner and Roxane Marschner divorced in 2016 after reaching a settlement agreement dividing their marital property. Richard received a lump sum from Roxane’s retirement account, and Roxane was to receive a portion of Richard’s Army National Guard pension and Federal Employees’ Retirement System benefits upon his retirement. The divorce judgment included provisions that if Richard took action to prevent or reduce Roxane’s share of his military retirement pay—including by waiving retirement pay in favor of disability pay—he would be required to indemnify Roxane. Both parties waived spousal support in the original settlement.After Richard was separated from the National Guard for medical reasons, he began receiving military disability retired pay and waived all his retirement pay. When Roxane attempted to collect her share, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service denied her request, stating that disability pay was not divisible under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act. Roxane then sought an amended judgment or redistribution of the marital estate from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District. The district court awarded Roxane spousal support equivalent to her lost share of Richard’s retirement pay, relying on the indemnification provision and reasoning that federal law did not prevent enforcement of the parties’ agreement.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether federal law preempts enforcement of the indemnification provision. The court held that federal law, as interpreted in Howell v. Howell, prohibits state courts from dividing military disability retired pay or enforcing indemnification provisions, even if contractually agreed upon. The district court’s award of spousal support was deemed an impermissible division of disability pay. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the amended judgment. View "Marschner v. Marschner" on Justia Law

The parties in this case have two minor children. Following their divorce in 2018, the mother was awarded primary residential responsibility based on agreement, and the father received limited parenting time. In February 2021, the father sought primary residential responsibility, leading to the appointment of a parenting investigator and subsequent hearings. Ultimately, the district court awarded equal residential responsibility, but after appellate review, the judgment was reversed due to insufficient findings. In February 2024, the father again moved for increased parenting time, which led to another evidentiary hearing. During this hearing, the court conducted an in chambers interview with one child over the mother’s objection and considered evidence from a prior parenting investigator’s report.The District Court of McLean County, South Central Judicial District, initially denied the father’s request for primary residential responsibility but granted an evidentiary hearing to consider modifying parenting time. After the hearing, the court found sufficient grounds for modification based on the mother’s interference with the parenting plan, the children’s desire to spend more time with their father, and uncertain exchange times. The court ordered increased parenting time for the father. The mother objected to the in chambers interview and the use of the parenting investigator’s report, arguing procedural errors and lack of proper notice.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s finding that a material change in circumstances justified modifying parenting time. However, it reversed the district court’s actions in conducting an in chambers interview without both parents’ consent and considering the parenting investigator’s report without notice and opportunity for cross-examination. The Supreme Court held that both errors were not harmless and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to conduct a new best interests analysis without considering the improperly admitted evidence, or to hold a supplemental evidentiary hearing if requested. View "Goetz v. Goetz" on Justia Law

The dispute arose after a tenant leased a residential property from a management company in West Fargo, North Dakota. After a disagreement involving a pet-related charge, the tenant failed to pay October rent. The management company served a notice to vacate and subsequently obtained a judgment of eviction, which included an early termination fee as specified in the lease. The tenant vacated the property before the end of the lease term and returned the keys. Later, the landlord sent an itemized list of damages and sought recovery for property repairs, as well as rent for the months following the tenant’s departure, despite having received the early termination fee.Upon commencement of a small claims action by the landlord for damages, the tenant removed the case to the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District. The tenant sought summary judgment, arguing that the landlord could not recover both an early termination fee and additional rent, and also contended that the landlord’s failure to timely provide the itemized list of damages should bar recovery. The district court denied summary judgment, held a bench trial, and ultimately ruled that the landlord could not recover both the early termination fee and post-eviction rent. However, the court allowed recovery for property damage, finding that the landlord had reasonable justification to withhold the security deposit despite the untimely itemization, since damages exceeded the deposit. The court awarded damages for repairs as well as attorney’s fees, as the tenant had removed the case from small claims court.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the landlord’s failure to timely provide an itemized statement of damages did not bar recovery, as the tenant was not prejudiced. The court also concluded that the tenant’s arguments regarding unconscionability and attorney’s fees were not properly preserved for appeal. The case was remanded solely for determination of additional attorney’s fees on appeal. View "Meridian Property Management v. Cordie" on Justia Law

The parties, following their divorce, entered into a stipulated judgment that set out how they would share expenses for their three children, including extracurricular activities, school events, and medical costs. The judgment required equal sharing for listed traditional activities, certain forms of communication about new or related expenses, and equal division of out-of-pocket medical expenses. Communication provisions specified that if a question was posed through their shared application and no response was received within five days, consent was presumed.After the judgment, the plaintiff moved the District Court of Stutsman County to hold the defendant in contempt for failing to pay his share of these expenses. The court found the defendant in contempt, rejecting his arguments about the form of communication required and about whether certain expenses were his responsibility. The court held line-by-line hearings on the expenses, found the plaintiff had met her burden for most items, and awarded remedial sanctions and attorney’s fees. This included some expenses that had not been previously submitted to the defendant, some for which there was no clear obligation under the judgment, and mileage for transporting children to therapy. The defendant appealed, also arguing that the plaintiff’s motion was frivolous and that he was entitled to his own attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant in contempt. However, it reversed the award of remedial sanctions and attorney’s fees in part, finding that some sanctions were for expenses already paid, not required under the judgment, or not properly supported by findings. It remanded for further proceedings to recalculate the proper amount of sanctions and attorney’s fees. The District Court’s order was thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Bedgar v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The case concerns a failed sale of a bar and restaurant in Bismarck, North Dakota. Neil Galpin, as assignee of Galpin Entertainment, sought to recover a $100,000 earnest money deposit after Cantina Holdings, LLC and Clay Butte Holdings, LLC (the buyers) did not complete the purchase. The parties had executed a confidential offer letter, which required the deposit and stated it would become non-refundable after the buyer’s due diligence period expired, unless the buyer notified the seller of its intent not to proceed before that date. Later, the parties signed a standard form purchase agreement that both incorporated the confidential letter and included a conflicting, pre-printed provision stating that if financing failed after a certain date, the earnest money would be returned to the buyer. The transaction never closed, and Galpin Entertainment ultimately sold the property to someone else.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, heard the case in a bench trial. The court concluded that the specially drafted provision in the confidential letter, rather than the standard form language in the purchase agreement, controlled the disposition of the earnest money. It found that the buyers did not properly exercise their right to terminate before the due diligence deadline and that Galpin did not breach the contract by failing to negotiate the contract for deed in good faith. Judgment was entered in favor of Neil Galpin for the earnest money, and the buyers’ counterclaims were denied.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that, when conflicting contract provisions exist, specially drafted terms control over standard form language, especially where the parties who caused the uncertainty seek to benefit from it. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s finding that Galpin negotiated in good faith. View "Galpin v. Cantina Holdings" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the primary residential responsibility and parenting time for a child born in 2024 to two unmarried parents. The father sought an interim order for custody, and after several reschedulings, a hearing was held where only the father's counsel and the mother's attorney appeared; the mother herself was absent. Subsequently, the court granted the father primary residential responsibility and gave the mother supervised parenting time. The mother’s attorney later withdrew, and the court set further hearings, but it was unclear if the mother received proper notice of these dates.When the mother failed to appear at the scheduled pretrial conference, the District Court of Stark County, Southwest Judicial District, sanctioned her by barring her from presenting any evidence at trial, except regarding her income for child support purposes. At trial, she appeared without counsel and was only allowed to testify about her income, while the father and his mother provided testimony on other issues. The district court then entered judgment awarding primary residential responsibility to the father, continuing supervised parenting time for the mother, and ordering her to pay child support. The mother appealed, arguing she was denied due process due to improper service and that the sanction was excessive.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It declined to address the mother’s due process arguments, finding her appellate briefs did not comply with procedural rules. However, it held that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an evidentiary sanction that prevented the court from considering evidence relevant to the child’s best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed the monetary sanction for attorney’s fees but reversed the evidentiary sanction, remanding for a new trial where sanctions, if imposed, must not interfere with the court’s ability to evaluate the child’s best interests. View "Kostelecky v. Erickson" on Justia Law

A long-time authorized equipment dealer, operating under two dealer sales agreements with a manufacturer, received notice in September 2024 that its agreements would be terminated in ninety days. The manufacturer cited alleged false and misleading statements, including altered business records, as grounds for termination under the agreements. The dealer responded by challenging the termination in court, invoking North Dakota statutes that regulate equipment dealer terminations and asserting that the filing of its action triggered an automatic stay against termination during litigation.The District Court of Morton County was asked by the manufacturer to dissolve or modify the automatic stay, arguing that the statutory stay only applied to certain products and not to the bulk of equipment covered by the agreements. The manufacturer presented evidence and legislative history to support its position. However, the district court denied the motion, holding that the statute mandates a procedural automatic stay upon the filing of the dealer’s action, and that the court lacked authority to dissolve or modify the stay at this stage. The court deferred any determination of which products were covered by which statute to later proceedings. The manufacturer then sought appellate review, but the district court did not rule on its request for certification under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) due to the pending appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed whether it had jurisdiction over the appeal. The court concluded that, although the automatic stay functioned as a statutory temporary injunction making the order appealable under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02(3), the absence of Rule 54(b) certification rendered the order not appealable at this stage. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and, finding no extraordinary circumstances or public interest, declined to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. View "Bobcat of Mandan v. Doosan Bobcat North America" on Justia Law

A man filed a negligence lawsuit against two relatives who operated a farm, after he suffered serious injuries from carbon monoxide exposure while repairing a furnace in their shop. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants used a portable propane heater, not designed for indoor use, to warm the shop, which created a dangerous buildup of carbon monoxide. The plaintiff claimed he was unaware of the danger and was injured as a result. Testimony at trial established that the plaintiff had a longstanding relationship with the defendants, performed occasional repairs for them, and that others present in the shop around the same time did not experience symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning. Both sides presented expert witnesses on the issue of causation.The District Court of Barnes County, Southeast Judicial District, held a jury trial. The jury returned a verdict finding the defendants were not negligent, and the court entered judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claim. The court also awarded the defendants costs and disbursements, including expert witness fees, ultimately reducing the amount requested after considering the reasonableness of the fees. The plaintiff did not file any post-trial motions.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the plaintiff could not raise for the first time on appeal the argument that the jury’s verdict was against the greater weight of the evidence, as he had not preserved this issue by a post-trial motion. The court also found no reversible error in the district court’s refusal to give plaintiff’s requested jury instructions regarding duty of care and regulatory violations, concluding the instructions given were adequate and appropriate. Lastly, the court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding expert witness fees. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Alber v. Rodin" on Justia Law