Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A woman was discovered inside a Minot, North Dakota residence by one of its occupants, who awoke to find her, a stranger, in his bedroom. Upon confronting her, he noticed her wearing mismatched Adidas shoes, and she emptied her pockets to reveal prescription medications and car keys belonging to the residents. After the woman fled, the residents found their home in disarray and discovered $1,600 in rent money and several pieces of gold jewelry missing from a secret compartment in a drawer. Shortly after, police located a woman matching the description, wearing the same shoes, who admitted to taking a gold ring and the shoes. She was identified as Winona Keplin.Keplin was charged with burglary and theft of property in the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District. Pursuant to a plea agreement, she pled guilty to burglary and the theft charge was dismissed. The State sought restitution for the missing cash and jewelry, and, after a hearing, the district court found the State’s witnesses credible and ordered Keplin to pay $5,882 in restitution, reflecting the value of the missing items.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion by awarding restitution for items not found on Keplin at her arrest. The Supreme Court applied a standard similar to abuse of discretion, affirming that findings of fact are not set aside unless clearly erroneous. The court distinguished this case from prior decisions where the causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the loss was lacking. Here, the court found sufficient evidence of a direct connection between Keplin’s burglary and the victims’ losses. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the amended criminal judgment ordering restitution. View "State v. Keplin" on Justia Law

Three children were removed multiple times from the home of their parents, S.S. and T.C., due to concerns about drug use and domestic violence. Initially, two children were removed in 2018, and all three children were subsequently placed in and out of care between 2018 and 2023. After a guardianship arrangement expired in 2023, law enforcement again found evidence of drug use in S.S.’s home, leading to another removal of the children in early 2024. The children were placed in the care of the Mountrail McKenzie Human Service Zone (MMHSZ).The State petitioned in 2025 to terminate the parental rights of both S.S. and T.C. Following a trial, the Juvenile Court of McKenzie County, Northwest Judicial District, found that the children were in need of protection and had been in care for the statutory number of nights required under North Dakota law. The juvenile court issued an order terminating S.S.’s parental rights. S.S. appealed, arguing that the juvenile court abused its discretion by not making a specific finding that reasonable efforts were made to reunify him with his children.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that, under the relevant statutes, a specific finding on reasonable efforts to reunify is not required at the time of termination of parental rights when the statutory criteria of need for protection and number of nights in care are met. The court further concluded that the juvenile court’s findings demonstrated sufficient consideration of the efforts made by social services and that its decision to terminate S.S.’s parental rights was not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination order. View "Interest of W.S." on Justia Law

A dispute arose concerning the residential responsibility and decision-making authority for a young child, M.R.M.-B., born to two unmarried parents, Monkman and Binney. After an incident in which Monkman withheld the child from Binney and the child was found with bruising and signs of neglect, Cass County Human Service Zone removed the child from both parents and placed her with the Hackmanns, who served as foster parents for approximately two years. Following the juvenile court’s decision to return the child to her parents, the Hackmanns sought to intervene and obtain residential responsibility, asserting they were psychological parents. Meanwhile, Binney and Monkman filed competing motions regarding residential responsibility and support.The District Court of Cass County first denied, then later granted, the Hackmanns’ motion to intervene, determining that the Uniform Nonparent Custody and Visitation Act (N.D.C.C. ch. 14-09.4) was not the exclusive means for nonparents to seek custody, and that an equitable claim as psychological parents was cognizable. After hearings, the district court awarded the Hackmanns primary residential responsibility and sole decision-making authority for the child, subject to Monkman’s supervised parenting time and Binney’s unsupervised time. Monkman appealed, challenging the award to the Hackmanns, the restriction on his parenting time, and the calculation of child support.The Supreme Court of North Dakota concluded that, under N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-02(3), a nonparent whose relationship with a child is based solely on foster parent status may not be found to be a psychological parent. It found the Hackmanns’ relationship with M.R.M.-B. was solely as foster parents and that the district court’s finding to the contrary was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the amended judgment, denied the Hackmanns’ request for attorney’s fees, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Interest of M.R.M." on Justia Law

After police received information that Jeffrey Simpson had made threats to “shoot it out with police” and possessed a handgun, a SWAT team was deployed to arrest him at his workplace. When officers confronted Simpson, he failed to comply with commands, was struck by a less-lethal projectile, and responded by firing two or three rounds at the officers before his firearm jammed. Simpson attempted to clear the malfunction, reloaded his weapon, fired an additional round into the ground, and then surrendered. He was charged with multiple offenses related to both the shooting incident and prior events.Simpson pleaded guilty to several charges, including burglary, domestic violence, and drug possession, in Grand Forks County District Court. He proceeded to a jury trial on four counts of attempted murder and three counts of reckless endangerment. The jury found Simpson guilty on all remaining charges. After sentencing, a criminal judgment was entered against him.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota, Simpson contended that the jury’s verdicts on the attempted murder counts were legally inconsistent and that there was insufficient evidence to support convictions on all four counts, given the limited number of shots fired. The Supreme Court held that the jury instructions correctly stated the law and that the definition of “substantial step” for attempted murder did not require separate shots for each named officer. The Court found no legal inconsistency in the verdicts and concluded that sufficient evidence supported the convictions under the deferential standard of review. The Court affirmed the criminal judgment but ordered the district court clerk to correct a clerical error regarding which counts Simpson pleaded guilty to and which were decided by jury verdict. View "State v. Simpson" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with domestic violence, a class B misdemeanor, after an incident on September 18, 2024. During pretrial proceedings, she requested an evaluation of her fitness to proceed, which led to delays as she alternately authorized and withdrew consent for the release of her medical records. The situation was further complicated by her involvement in other pending criminal cases. After missing a hearing and further delays in obtaining the evaluation, the court issued a bench warrant to secure her presence for the evaluation, which ultimately found her fit to proceed. Following additional continuances and attorney substitutions, a jury found her guilty, and she was sentenced to 30 days in jail, with credit for time served.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, managed the proceedings. At no point did the court find that the defendant was unfit to proceed; instead, the proceedings were delayed due to the complications surrounding the fitness evaluation and her cooperation. The defendant did not raise the issue of delay or seek dismissal under North Dakota statutes or procedural rules until her appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case on appeal. The defendant argued that the case should have been dismissed because the period for suspending proceedings under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-08(2) or for undue delay under N.D.R.Crim.P. 48 had been exceeded. The Supreme Court held that the statutory dismissal deadline was never triggered because the district court had not found the defendant lacked fitness to proceed. The Court also found that Rule 48 did not provide a clear legal basis for dismissal under the circumstances and that there was no showing of prejudice. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "State v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

A parent applied to a state-run program providing compensation for family members who give extraordinary care to individuals with significant medical needs. The applicant’s young child required extensive daily assistance due to chronic health issues. The Department of Health and Human Services denied the application, explaining that the child’s score on a standardized assessment, created internally by the Department, did not meet the minimum threshold to qualify for the program. The assessment assigned points based on responses to a set of questions about the child’s needs, and only those scoring at least fifty percent of possible points for their age group were deemed eligible.After the application was denied, the parent pursued an administrative appeal. The administrative law judge upheld the denial, finding that, under the Department’s rules, only the assessment score determined eligibility for “extraordinary care,” and other medical details were not considered. The Department adopted this finding in a final order and denied a rehearing. The parent then appealed to the District Court of Burleigh County, which affirmed the Department’s decision.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the Department could use the assessment and its scoring rubric to determine eligibility, even though these criteria had not been formally promulgated as administrative rules. The Court held that because these tools operated as binding eligibility requirements of general applicability, they were rules under North Dakota’s Administrative Agencies Practice Act and should have been formally adopted through the rulemaking process. The Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Ferderer v. NDDHHS" on Justia Law

The case involves Richard Romanyshyn, who was subject to a disorderly conduct restraining order (DCRO) issued in Stark County, North Dakota, which included two minor children as protected parties. Romanyshyn was personally served with the DCRO and did not appeal it. Later, he allegedly violated the order by sending text messages to one or more protected parties. Subsequently, he was charged with violating the DCRO, a class A misdemeanor. Separately, a DCRO was issued against him in Hettinger County involving the same parties, but the North Dakota Supreme Court later reversed that order and remanded for an evidentiary hearing in Davis v. Romanyshyn, 2025 ND 18.After the Supreme Court’s reversal of the Hettinger County DCRO, Romanyshyn moved to dismiss the Stark County criminal charge, arguing that the DCRO in his case was invalid under the Davis precedent. The State responded that the Supreme Court’s decision in the Hettinger County matter did not affect the Stark County DCRO. The District Court of Stark County denied Romanyshyn’s motion to dismiss, finding that his challenge was a legal, not factual, one, and that no evidentiary hearing or factual findings were necessary.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The Court held that because Romanyshyn’s argument was purely legal and not dependent on disputed facts, the district court was not required to make factual findings. Further, the Supreme Court determined that the district court did not improperly take judicial notice of adjudicative facts. The Court declined to address the merits of the collateral attack argument because Romanyshyn did not brief the issue. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the amended criminal judgment. View "State v. Romanyshyn" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with robbery and reckless endangerment in December 2024 while on parole for a prior conviction. He was arrested on December 18, 2024, did not post bond, and his parole was revoked during his pretrial custody. In June 2025, the robbery charge was amended to aggravated assault, and the defendant pled guilty to both aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. The district court sentenced him to five years for aggravated assault and two years for reckless endangerment, to run consecutively and consecutive to another sentence not at issue. The court did not give the defendant credit for time served in custody between his arrest and sentencing.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, presided over sentencing. The defendant argued at sentencing that he should receive credit for time served from his arrest, claiming his custody was due to the new charges. The State contended the custody resulted from his parole revocation on a previous conviction. The defendant’s attorney acknowledged the parole was revoked five days after arrest but presented no evidence regarding the timing or application of credit. The district court found the time in custody was due to the parole violation, not the new charges, and denied credit for time served. The defendant appealed the sentence, claiming entitlement to credit and arguing the State bore the burden to prove facts supporting the denial.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that under North Dakota law, the burden is on the defendant to show entitlement to credit for time served, and a defendant is not entitled to credit for time served on an unrelated prior conviction. The court found no abuse of discretion or illegality in the sentence, as it was within statutory limits and based on proper factors. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the criminal judgment. View "State v. Barse" on Justia Law

B.S. filed a petition for a domestic violence protection order against Carlos Lopez-Rangel on behalf of herself and the parties’ two minor children, alleging that Lopez-Rangel sexually assaulted her in her home. B.S. provided testimony and physical evidence of the alleged assaults, including medical findings and photographs of injuries. She also noted that the children were present in the home during the incidents but did not know if they were awake or aware of what had occurred. At the time, Lopez-Rangel faced related criminal charges, and no-contact orders were in place to protect B.S. and the children.The District Court of Dunn County, Southwest Judicial District, first issued a temporary protection order, then, after a hearing, entered a domestic violence protection order in favor of B.S. and the two minor children, with the order designated to last for an unlimited duration. The district court found that domestic violence had been committed against B.S. but made no specific findings of harm or imminent harm to the children. Lopez-Rangel appealed, contesting the inclusion of his children as protected parties and challenging the unlimited duration of the order.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that there was sufficient evidence to support B.S.'s inclusion as a protected party, affirming that portion of the order. However, the court found no evidence of domestic violence directed at or witnessed by the children and therefore reversed their inclusion as protected parties. The court also found the district court abused its discretion by imposing an unlimited duration without sufficient findings, reversed that portion, and remanded for the district court to set a reasonable duration supported by specific findings. View "B.S. v. Lopez-Rangel" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two parents, Khilyn Craig and Dwayne Vormestrand, over the primary residential responsibility for their minor child. Initially, both parties agreed to share equal residential responsibility, with a provision that Craig would gain primary responsibility and could relocate once the child reached school age. Over time, both parties failed to adhere to the parenting schedule, leading to court admonishments. In 2024, Craig relocated to Texas with the child before the court ruled on her motion to enforce the automatic modification provision. Both parties subsequently filed motions seeking primary residential responsibility.The District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, held a hearing in December 2024, where Craig represented herself. After hearing testimony from both parties and other witnesses, the court awarded Vormestrand primary residential responsibility in an amended judgment. Craig then moved for a new trial or reconsideration, arguing that there were procedural irregularities, insufficient evidence, and that the decision was against the law. The District Court denied her motion, concluding it had properly considered all relevant factors, especially Craig’s conduct in withholding the child and relocating without court approval.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying a new trial or reconsideration. Applying an abuse of discretion standard, the Supreme Court held that, despite a minor misinterpretation of the statutory domestic violence factor, the error was harmless because the District Court did not find credible evidence of domestic violence. The Supreme Court concluded the District Court’s findings were supported by the record, it gave proper weight to the parties’ conduct, and no procedural irregularities warranted a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed both the amended judgment awarding Vormestrand primary residential responsibility and the order denying a new trial or reconsideration. View "Vormestrand v. Craig" on Justia Law