Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

David Hughes and Dana Waters were in a relationship beginning in 2016 while living in Washington. During their relationship, Hughes raised Waters’s son, C.H., as his own, and later they had another son, D.H. Following their separation, they shared custody on a rotating basis. Hughes moved to North Dakota in late 2020, and the children visited him there during holidays and summers. In April 2023, Waters moved with the children to California. That summer, Hughes flew the children to North Dakota for vacation and later informed Waters he would not return them, citing concerns for their safety.After Hughes’s decision to keep the children, both parties initiated legal proceedings: Waters filed a complaint in California on August 9, 2023, but did not serve Hughes until October 20, 2023. Hughes began a child custody action in North Dakota by serving Waters on August 30, 2023. The California court issued ex parte orders for the return of the children, first claiming emergency jurisdiction, then issuing a non-temporary order, both before Hughes was served. The North Dakota District Court of McKenzie County held a hearing, invited arguments on jurisdiction, and communicated with the California court. Eventually, California transferred its case to Washington, although there was no evidence of a pending Washington action.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The court held that neither California nor North Dakota was the children’s “home state,” and no other state had a pending child custody action or declined jurisdiction. North Dakota properly assumed jurisdiction under N.D.C.C. § 14-14.1-12(1)(d). The court affirmed the district court’s order granting primary residential responsibility of D.H. and C.H. to Hughes and rejected Waters’s additional challenges. View "Hughes v. Waters" on Justia Law

Andrew Sangster, on behalf of a class of flight instructors, filed suit against the University of North Dakota alleging that instructors were not paid for all hours worked. Sangster claimed the university compensated instructors only for student contact hours and excluded other work-related tasks such as scheduling, pre- and post-flight procedures, recordkeeping, and waiting at the airport. He sought damages for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), North Dakota wage laws, unjust enrichment, and conversion.The District Court for Cass County reviewed the university’s motion to dismiss, which argued the court lacked jurisdiction because Sangster failed to give timely notice to the Office of Management and Budget as required by North Dakota law. Sangster admitted he had not provided this notice but contended his claims were contractual and thus exempt from the notice requirement. The district court denied the motion to dismiss with respect to the FLSA, state wage law, and unjust enrichment claims, finding them contractual in nature. The conversion claim was dismissed because Sangster conceded the notice requirement applied.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota subsequently reviewed the district court’s decision upon the University’s petition for a supervisory writ. The Supreme Court exercised its discretionary supervisory jurisdiction, holding that Sangster’s claims for relief under the FLSA, North Dakota wage laws, and unjust enrichment were not contractual in nature and therefore not authorized by N.D.C.C. ch. 32-12. The Supreme Court concluded that because Sangster had not complied with the statutory notice requirements for noncontractual claims, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court granted the supervisory writ and directed the district court to dismiss Sangster’s case for lack of jurisdiction. View "UND v. Whelan" on Justia Law

A seventeen-year-old defendant was charged with murder after stabbing another individual during an altercation in a Grand Forks, North Dakota apartment parking lot. The victim died from the stab wound. With the assistance of counsel, the defendant entered into a plea agreement, pleading guilty to murder. The agreement stipulated a sixty-year sentence with twenty years suspended, and permitted the defendant to request a downward departure to as low as fifteen years. During the plea hearing, the court confirmed the defendant’s understanding of the plea and its consequences, and accepted the plea as voluntary.The District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, presided over the case. At sentencing, the court reviewed investigative reports, victim impact statements, and arguments from both sides. The court considered the defendant’s age and behavior, including social media posts related to the incident. Ultimately, the court imposed a sixty-year sentence with twenty years suspended, consistent with the plea agreement, without granting a downward departure. The defendant did not object to the adequacy of the plea colloquy or move to withdraw the guilty plea before sentencing.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal. The defendant argued that the plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent due to an insufficient Rule 11 colloquy, and that the forty-year sentence was cruel and unusual punishment. The court applied the obvious error standard, finding that the District Court erred by not adequately establishing a factual basis for the plea, but concluded the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. The court further held that the forty-year sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the offense and did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the amended criminal judgment. View "State v. Haskins" on Justia Law

Several trusts owned by the Garaas family hold mineral interests in McKenzie County, North Dakota. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. operates a well on these lands, which are subject to two distinct spacing units created by orders of the North Dakota Industrial Commission (NDIC): a base unit and an overlapping unit. NDIC issued an order allocating production from the well in the overlapping unit to Section 20, which is part of the base unit but not wholly contained within the overlapping unit. This allocation reduced the Trusts’ royalty interests, prompting them to seek declaratory relief and damages.The Trusts first brought their claims in the District Court of McKenzie County, but the court dismissed the case. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the Trusts were required to exhaust administrative remedies before the NDIC. Subsequently, Petro-Hunt applied to NDIC for clarification on production allocation, and NDIC issued Order No. 33453, allocating production from the overlapping unit to the base unit. The Trusts appealed NDIC’s order to the district court, which affirmed NDIC’s order. The Trusts then appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that NDIC had legal authority under statute to allocate oil and gas production among spacing units. However, the court concluded that NDIC did not regularly pursue its authority because it failed to follow proper procedures, including providing notice and opportunity to participate to all affected interest owners. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and vacated NDIC Order No. 33453. The request for attorney’s fees by the Trusts was denied, as the record did not show NDIC acted without substantial justification. View "Garaas v. NDIC" on Justia Law

Ashley Cull and Andrew Cull were married in 2013 and have two children, born in 2016 and 2019. After initiating a divorce in 2021, a stipulated judgment was entered in January 2022, with Andrew awarded primary residential responsibility for the children. An amended judgment in March 2022 reaffirmed this arrangement. In February 2025, Ashley filed a motion to modify primary residential responsibility, arguing that material changes had occurred since the prior order which warranted a shift in custody to her. She submitted declarations from herself and her parents, alleging that Andrew delegated parenting to his mother, lacked routine in his home, and made unsafe decisions affecting the children.The Northeast Judicial District Court, Pembina County, reviewed Ashley’s motion and supporting documents, along with Andrew’s fourteen counter-declarations. The district court denied Ashley’s motion, concluding that she failed to establish a prima facie case under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6, as there was no material change in circumstances nor evidence that modification was necessary to serve the children’s best interests. The court found much of Ashley’s evidence was not based on firsthand knowledge or was not competent, and that extended family involvement and Andrew’s occupation as a farmer were known factors at the time of the original custody determination.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s order de novo. It held that Ashley Cull did not provide competent evidence of a material change in circumstances or show that modification was necessary for the children's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to modify primary residential responsibility, concluding that the statutory requirements for a prima facie case were not met. View "Cull v. Cull" on Justia Law

The dispute arose after a citizen, Sanderson, served a summons and complaint on Kelley Cole, the Walsh County State’s Attorney, alleging that Cole failed to investigate crimes as required by law and deprived him of constitutional rights. Sanderson later claimed the complaint was mistakenly served and was only a draft, not intended for court filing. Cole, upon being served, filed the summons and complaint with the district court, moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and sought attorney’s fees, arguing the action was frivolous and barred by prosecutorial immunity.The District Court of Walsh County, Northeast Judicial District, reviewed the matter. Cole’s motion to dismiss was based on North Dakota’s procedural rules, which allow an action to commence upon service of summons, and permit a defendant to file the complaint. Sanderson responded by agreeing to dismiss but contested the court’s jurisdiction and objected to the lack of a hearing. The district court determined it had jurisdiction, found Sanderson had commenced the action, and concluded the complaint lacked factual allegations and was barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. The court dismissed the action, denied Sanderson’s subsequent motions, and awarded Cole attorney’s fees, finding the claims frivolous.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that jurisdiction was proper since Sanderson initiated the action by serving process, and procedural irregularities in filing did not affect substantial rights or deprive the court of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court agreed that the complaint failed to state a claim and that absolute prosecutorial immunity applied. It further upheld the finding of frivolousness and the award of attorney’s fees, determining there was no abuse of discretion or violation of procedural rights. View "Sanderson v. Cole" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with practicing law without a license after submitting court filings on behalf of another individual in a criminal case in Wells County, North Dakota. The filings included motions and related documents, each signed to indicate the defendant was representing the incarcerated individual. The State filed charges based on these actions, and after pretrial proceedings, the case proceeded to a jury trial.Prior to trial, the District Court of Wells County addressed several motions. The defendant’s motion to dismiss, based on alleged unlawful access by law enforcement to jail communications, was denied as untimely under the court’s pretrial order and applicable procedural rules. The State’s motion to amend the information to expand the offense date was granted after the court found no additional or different offense was charged and no substantial right was prejudiced. The court also ruled, over the defendant’s objection, that the offense of practicing law without a license was a strict liability crime under North Dakota law, and removed the requirement of a culpable mental state from the jury instructions. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the district court entered a criminal judgment and sentenced the defendant.On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the defendant raised several issues. The court only considered those claims that were properly preserved and sufficiently briefed. The Supreme Court found the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss as untimely, allowing amendment of the information, or removing the mens rea element from the jury instructions. The Supreme Court held that the statute under which the defendant was convicted is a strict liability offense, and the jury instructions accurately reflected the law. The criminal judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Olson" on Justia Law

Law enforcement discovered a handgun in a vehicle parked outside a bar while the defendant was inside the bar. The defendant, who was previously convicted of a qualifying offense, was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. At trial, the defendant objected to the proposed jury instructions regarding the definition of “possession,” arguing that the instructions failed to require proof of intent as allegedly mandated by recent amendments to the relevant statute. The defendant also moved for a judgment of acquittal, asserting insufficient evidence linked him to the vehicle containing the gun. The court denied the motion, and the jury returned a guilty verdict.The District Court of Ward County presided over the trial. The defendant’s objections to the jury instructions were overruled, and the motion for judgment of acquittal was denied. After conviction, the defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its jury instructions by not requiring the State to prove intent to possess the firearm and by not entering a judgment of acquittal due to insufficient evidence that the handgun qualified as a “firearm” under the law.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and held that, under the amended statute, intent is required only for convictions based on constructive possession, not for actual possession, and the district court’s jury instructions properly reflected this distinction. The Court also held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a rational fact finder to conclude the handgun was functional, as required by statute, and thus the district court did not commit obvious error by failing to enter a judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the criminal judgment. View "State v. Luetzen" on Justia Law

Authorities responded to a residence to investigate an alleged assault involving a young child. Upon arrival, social workers and a detective entered the property through an open garage door, which led to an interior entryway. The resident, Shantel Lais, allowed them inside. Once inside, the detective observed hazardous conditions, including accessible firearms, open alcohol, drugs, and drug paraphernalia within reach of a two-year-old child. As a result, Christopher Golberg was charged with child neglect, unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, and unlawful possession of a firearm.Prior to trial in the District Court of Mercer County, South Central Judicial District, Golberg moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search, arguing the detective unlawfully entered the garage without a warrant or consent, thus tainting the evidence subsequently gathered. A suppression hearing was held, where the detective testified that the garage functioned as the main entrance due to home construction and that the exterior door was open. The district court found that Golberg did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the garage under these circumstances and denied the motion to suppress. At trial, Golberg twice moved for judgment of acquittal on the basis that he did not reside at the house; both motions were denied. The jury found Golberg guilty of child neglect and not guilty on the other charges.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota considered whether the denial of the suppression motion and the sufficiency of the evidence were erroneous. The court held that the open garage, serving as the main access point and lacking express signs restricting entry, did not afford Golberg a reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, no unlawful search occurred. The court also found that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict on child neglect. The amended criminal judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Golberg" on Justia Law

This case concerns a business dispute between two individuals, Alan Weigel and Jason Albertson, regarding Veritas Crane LLC, a company providing crane and hoist services. Albertson founded Veritas in 2018, and Weigel joined the business in 2019, with both claiming at least 50% ownership. Their relationship deteriorated, leading Albertson to request the company’s bank to restrict access to its accounts due to allegations of fraudulent activity. In response, Weigel limited Albertson’s access to company facilities. Weigel then filed a complaint, naming himself and Veritas as plaintiffs, asserting both derivative claims on behalf of Veritas and direct claims against Albertson.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, reviewed the matter after Albertson moved to disqualify Weigel’s attorney, Joel Fremstad. The court found that Fremstad had a lawyer-client relationship with both Weigel and Veritas, relying on evidence such as Fremstad’s signing of pleadings for both plaintiffs and communications indicating he advised Weigel in his role as CEO of Veritas. The court concluded that this concurrent representation violated North Dakota Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a), which prohibits representation of adverse clients, and ordered Fremstad’s disqualification.The Supreme Court of North Dakota addressed Weigel’s appeal and his petition for a supervisory writ. It determined the disqualification order was not immediately appealable under statutory law or the collateral order doctrine and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Exercising its supervisory authority, the Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s order for abuse of discretion and clear error. Although it noted a harmless legal error in the district court’s reasoning regarding derivative suits, the Supreme Court held that the underlying factual findings were supported by the record. The Court denied the petition for a supervisory writ, upholding the disqualification of Fremstad. View "Weigel v. Albertson" on Justia Law