Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A healthcare clinic and several physicians providing abortion services in North Dakota challenged the constitutionality of N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-19.1, a law criminalizing most abortions with certain exceptions. The plaintiffs argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague regarding when abortions could be performed to preserve the life or health of a pregnant woman. They asserted that the law's language failed to provide clear guidance to physicians about permissible conduct, especially given the severe criminal penalties for violations. Testimony from medical experts detailed the unpredictable and rapidly evolving risks that pregnancy can pose to a mother's health, and highlighted the difficulties in interpreting the statutory terms such as “serious health risk,” “substantial physical impairment,” and “major bodily function.”The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The court found that the statute was impermissibly vague, concluding that its unclear language chilled physicians from providing constitutionally protected medical care. The court also determined that the law infringed on pregnant women’s fundamental rights under the North Dakota Constitution and was not narrowly tailored to promote health or protect life. As a result, the court declared N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-19.1 unconstitutional and void.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s judgment. The justices issued separate opinions, but did not reach the four-member majority required by the state constitution to declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional. Therefore, the effect was that the district court’s judgment was reversed, and N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-19.1 was not declared unconstitutional. The main holding is that, due to the lack of a sufficient majority, the abortion law was not invalidated and the lower court's judgment was reversed. View "Access Independent Health Services, Inc. v. Wrigley" on Justia Law

Antonio Eugenio Medina entered a guilty plea following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence in a criminal case. Medina, his attorney, the prosecutor, and the district court discussed and appeared to agree that his plea was conditional, allowing him to reserve the right to appeal the suppression ruling. However, the written judgment did not specify that the plea was conditional as required by the applicable procedural rule.The District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, presided over Medina’s plea hearing and subsequent proceedings. Despite indications in the transcript that all parties consented to a conditional plea, the court did not issue a written order or judgment expressly stating that the plea was conditional, nor did the record contain written consents as required by N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). Medina appealed, arguing that his plea should be recognized as conditional so that he could pursue an appeal of the suppression decision.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the record and found that while the transcript reflected substantial compliance with the requirements for a conditional plea, the absence of a written order and a judgment specifying that the plea was conditional did not satisfy the explicit requirements of N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), as amended in 2017. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to clarify whether it accepted a conditional plea and, if so, to enter an order and correct the judgment to properly reflect the conditional nature of the plea. The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction pending the district court’s clarification. The holding requires district courts to strictly comply with the procedural requirements for conditional pleas under Rule 11(a)(2), including written consents, a court order, and a judgment specifying the plea is conditional. View "State v. Medina" on Justia Law

Kyle Wardner and Tamara Porath were the parents of a minor child, E.M.M.W., who was born in 2017 while the parents resided in different countries—Wardner in North Dakota and Tamara Porath in Canada. After Tamara Porath’s death in November 2020, her sister, Rebecca Porath, sought legal guardianship of the child in Canada. Wardner opposed the application, and the Canadian court ultimately awarded him primary residential responsibility for E.M.M.W., who then moved to North Dakota. In May 2022, both parties stipulated to a final Canadian order that established Wardner’s custody and the Poraths’ visitation rights. Wardner registered this order in North Dakota in May 2024.Subsequently, Wardner filed a motion in the District Court of McLean County, South Central Judicial District, seeking to modify the Canadian visitation order. After a hearing in January 2025, during which both sides testified, the district court denied Wardner’s motion. The court found that Wardner had not demonstrated a material change in circumstances required for modification under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6, the statute it applied to the case. The Poraths also argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction but conceded North Dakota was the child’s home state.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), and that it erred by applying the wrong statutory standard. The Supreme Court determined that N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-14, governing modification of nonparent visitation, was the correct statute to apply to Wardner’s motion, rather than the statute for modifying primary residential responsibility. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions for further proceedings under the proper law. View "Wardner v. Porath" on Justia Law

Evan Markestad and Joy Markestad, who divorced in early 2023, share two minor children. Joy was awarded primary residential responsibility, while Evan received parenting time. In summer 2024, Evan agreed that Joy and the children could temporarily reside in Bismarck. Joy later decided to remain in Bismarck permanently and enrolled the children in school there. In March 2025, Evan moved to modify parenting time due to the changed circumstances. Joy partially agreed, asking the district court to alter the school-year schedule but not the summer and holiday arrangements. The district court held a hearing and issued an order and amended judgment modifying parenting time.In the District Court of Ramsey County, Northeast Judicial District, the court examined both parties’ proposals for summer parenting time. Evan requested the entire summer, whereas Joy proposed alternating weekends and two additional weeks. The court considered their respective work schedules, finding Joy, as a teacher with summers off, more available and able to transport the children. The court also considered Evan’s farming obligations, noting his work frequently interrupted the prior parenting schedule. The court ultimately awarded Evan two consecutive weeks in July, Father’s Day, and an additional two-week vacation period, rather than adopting either party’s full proposal. The court also considered the conduct of both parties, including Joy’s lack of candor regarding her move and Evan’s demeaning language, but concluded the record supported its findings.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s decision under the clearly erroneous standard and affirmed both the order modifying parenting time and the amended judgment. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not misapply the law or prioritize Joy’s wishes over the children’s best interests, and its findings were supported by the record. Requests for attorney’s fees by both parties were denied, and the Supreme Court found the appeal was not frivolous. View "Markestad v. Markestad" on Justia Law

Niko Solis was charged with indecent exposure, a class A misdemeanor, after engaging in conduct outside a courthouse near a school. He entered a guilty plea to the charge. The State requested that Solis be required to register as a sex offender, while Solis argued that the court should exercise its discretion to deviate from the registration requirement, citing statutory criteria that permit deviation under certain circumstances.The District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, presided by Judge Stacy J. Louser, sentenced Solis to 360 days’ imprisonment with all but one day suspended, imposed two years of supervised probation, and required Solis to register as a sex offender under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15(2)(b). The court acknowledged its discretion to deviate from registration but ultimately declined to do so, citing concerns about the nature of Solis’s conduct and his explanation for it. Solis appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion and failed to make specific findings required for deviation.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. It held that the statute’s language allows the court discretion to deviate from the registration requirement if certain criteria are met, but does not mandate deviation even if those criteria are satisfied. The Supreme Court determined that the district court’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and that it was the result of a rational process. The Supreme Court affirmed the criminal judgment and the requirement that Solis register as a sex offender. View "State v. Solis" on Justia Law

This case concerns a dispute among siblings regarding the partition of farmland in Grant County, North Dakota, originally owned by their parents. After the parents conveyed the land to their children as tenants in common, reserving life estates, four siblings transferred their interests into a family trust in 2017, leaving Bryan Tischmak as the sole sibling outside the trust. In 2022, the trust entered into an agreement for rock, sand, and gravel extraction on portions of the property. Bryan initiated a partition action in 2023, seeking division of the land and an accounting of income.The District Court of Grant County, South Central Judicial District, presided over a bench trial, during which the parties stipulated to the appointment of a referee to recommend partition options. Bryan advocated for an option that would award him sections including the family homeplace, but the court adopted a different recommendation (Recommendation 5), granting him the S1/2 of Section 33 and the NW1/4 of Section 34, and ordering the trust to pay him a sum based on the property’s value and his share of land income. The court later corrected a clerical mistake that had mistakenly awarded Bryan all of Section 33 instead of the S1/2, and denied Bryan's motions to alter or amend the judgment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in adopting the referee’s recommendation, correcting clerical errors, and calculating Bryan’s share of income and expenses. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion and that its findings were not clearly erroneous. However, the Supreme Court modified the judgment to require the trust to reimburse Bryan $2,417.20 for certain trust-exclusive expenses. The judgment was otherwise affirmed as modified. View "Tischmak v. Theurer" on Justia Law

In March 2024, Christopher Bauer was charged with disorderly conduct following an incident in Williston, North Dakota. He retained legal counsel and the case proceeded to a jury trial, at the conclusion of which Bauer was acquitted. After his acquittal, Bauer submitted a motion seeking reimbursement for attorney’s fees and costs incurred during the defense of his criminal prosecution.The District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial District, presided over by Judge Kirsten M. Sjue, reviewed Bauer’s post-judgment motion. The court denied his request for attorney’s fees and costs, determining that Bauer had not established a legal basis for recovering such expenses in the context of the criminal proceeding. Bauer also argued that the district court judge committed misconduct warranting discipline, but the court’s order did not address this allegation, and there was no indication that the issue had been properly raised or preserved during district court proceedings.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota considered whether the district court’s post-judgment order was appealable and addressed the merits of Bauer’s requests. The Supreme Court held that Bauer’s motion for recovery of attorney’s fees, which sought reimbursement of property allegedly expended in connection with the criminal action, constituted a substantial right under N.D.C.C. § 29-28-06(5), making the order appealable. However, the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Bauer’s motion, finding he had not shown entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs in the criminal case. The Supreme Court also declined to consider Bauer’s judicial misconduct claim on appeal, as it had not been preserved in the trial court. The district court’s order was affirmed. View "City of Williston v. Bauer" on Justia Law

The case involves a parent, D.A.D., whose parental rights regarding his child, G.M.H., were challenged following a period of incarceration. D.A.D. and the child’s mother, K.R.H., separated in June 2022. Shortly after, D.A.D. was arrested and later convicted of possessing child pornography, resulting in nearly three years of incarceration. During his imprisonment, D.A.D. made limited attempts to communicate with G.M.H., sending only a few letters and making a small number of phone calls. The divorce judgment provided for supervised parenting time after his release, contingent on D.A.D. providing specific information to K.R.H., which he failed to do.A petition for termination of parental rights and for adoption was filed by K.R.H. and her spouse, D.A.H., in April 2025. The District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, held a hearing and found by clear and convincing evidence that D.A.D. had abandoned G.M.H. and that his conduct, faults, and neglect justified termination of his parental rights. The court cited his lack of meaningful contact and support, both before and during his incarceration, and concluded that there was no reasonable expectation his behavior would change.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its discretionary decision for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s finding of abandonment was supported by the evidence and not clearly erroneous. The court also determined that the statutory definition of abandonment, as applied, did not violate D.A.D.’s constitutional rights, as it required consideration of whether failures to communicate or support were without justifiable cause, including incarceration. The order terminating D.A.D.’s parental rights was affirmed. View "Adoption of G.M.H." on Justia Law

Two minor children, J.C. and S.C.Y., both enrolled members of the Mandan Hidatsa Arikara Nation, were placed in the care of Ward County Human Service Zone after repeated removals due to concerns about their mother, P.D.'s, ability to provide proper care. The children were found to be in need of protection and had spent substantial periods in foster care. The State sought termination of P.D.’s parental rights, alleging persistent issues that endangered the children’s well-being, including P.D.'s instability, incomplete compliance with service plans, ongoing substance abuse, and involvement in criminal activity.The Juvenile Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, reviewed the petitions and held a trial. The court considered testimony from various witnesses and documentary evidence, including progress reports and judicial notice of prior protection proceedings. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of protection, the causes for protection were likely to continue, and the children had suffered harm. The court also found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that returning the children to P.D. would likely cause them serious emotional or physical harm. The court terminated P.D.’s parental rights.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s factual findings and conclusions regarding the need for protection and likelihood of ongoing harm. However, the Supreme Court found that the juvenile court failed to make the required specific findings under N.D.C.C. § 27-19.1-01(2), which mandates detailed findings that “active efforts” were made to provide remedial and rehabilitative services to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and that these efforts were unsuccessful. The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and remanded the case for the juvenile court to make these necessary findings, allowing additional evidence if required. View "Interest of S.C.Y." on Justia Law

Kolstad and Claussen are the unmarried parents of two minor children, having lived together for about four years before separating in early 2024. Claussen also has primary residential responsibility for a child from a previous marriage. After their separation, Kolstad initiated a legal action seeking primary residential responsibility and child support for their two children, while Claussen counterclaimed for the same relief. The district court held a bench trial in October 2024, during which Claussen requested either primary or equal residential responsibility.Following the trial, the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, awarded Kolstad and Claussen equal residential responsibility for their children and ordered Claussen to pay Kolstad $157 per month in child support. The district court found that Claussen’s change in employment was motivated by a desire to parent his children and not to reduce his child support obligation. Kolstad appealed, arguing that the district court failed to make adequate findings regarding two statutory best interest factors: the developmental needs of the children and evidence of domestic violence.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and applied the clearly erroneous standard to the district court’s factual findings. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that Claussen’s employment change was not intended to reduce his child support obligation. However, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment in part, finding that the district court did not make sufficient findings or provide adequate explanation regarding best interest factors (c) (the children’s developmental needs and the parents’ ability to meet those needs) and (j) (evidence of domestic violence). The Supreme Court remanded the case for further findings and clarification on those factors, instructing the district court to explain its reasoning and to clarify whether the statutory presumption regarding domestic violence applies. View "Kolstad v. Claussen" on Justia Law