Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Thomas Eastgate was subject to probation revocation proceedings in five consolidated criminal cases. At his initial appearance, he was briefly represented by an attorney making a limited appearance, but for subsequent proceedings, Eastgate did not have counsel. He posted bond and, shortly before the scheduled revocation hearing, requested a continuance to retain or consult counsel and prepare his defense. The court denied his continuance request and his application for indigent defense services, determining Eastgate was ineligible due to his income. Eastgate proceeded to the revocation hearing without counsel, did not cross-examine witnesses or present testimony, and was found to have willfully violated probation in all five cases. He was resentenced to five years on each count, served concurrently.The District Court of Morton County, South Central Judicial District, presided over the revocation hearing. The court denied Eastgate’s requests for a continuance and appointed counsel, then proceeded with the hearing and sentencing without making a determination as to whether Eastgate’s waiver of counsel was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, or advising him of the disadvantages of self-representation.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal, applying a de novo standard to the interpretation of court rules and an abuse of discretion standard to the denial of continuance. The Supreme Court held that the district court misapplied Rule 32(f)(3)(A), N.D.R.Crim.P., by failing to determine whether Eastgate voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel, and by proceeding with the revocation hearing without the required findings. The Court also found the denial of Eastgate’s continuance motion unreasonable. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the probation revocation orders in all five cases and remanded for a new revocation hearing consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Eastgate" on Justia Law

Several townships, individuals, and entities challenged a decision related to the construction of an electric transmission line. In early 2024, two utility companies applied to the North Dakota Public Service Commission (PSC) for a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) to build an 85-mile, high-voltage transmission line. The PSC provided public notice in various newspapers and held hearings before granting the CPCN later that year. No party appealed this order at that time. Months after the order was issued, a group of petitioners—including the townships and individuals—sought to intervene, arguing that the PSC’s order was deficient and that the wrong statutory framework had been applied.The PSC denied the petitioners’ request to intervene, stating that the decision on the CPCN was final and that deadlines to appeal or seek reconsideration had already passed. The PSC also noted that further permitting and proceedings would occur before construction, where concerns could be raised. The petitioners then appealed to the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District. The district court dismissed as untimely the portion of the appeal challenging the CPCN order, affirmed the PSC’s denial of intervention, and concluded it lacked jurisdiction to address the validity of the CPCN order.On review, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the petitioners lacked standing to appeal the CPCN order because they did not participate in the original proceedings before the PSC. The Court further held that the PSC did not abuse its discretion in denying post-hoc intervention, finding that notice by publication was sufficient and that the petitioners had not shown good cause for their late intervention request. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Wano Township v. North Dakota Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

A divorced couple with one minor child had an initial judgment and an amended judgment entered in 2022, awarding the mother primary residential responsibility and setting the father’s child support obligation based on his high income at that time. In August 2024, the father moved to modify residential responsibility, amend the parenting plan, and reduce his child support after changing employment to a lower-paying job in December 2024. The parties stipulated at the hearing that they would provide any additional income information requested by the State Child Support Enforcement Agency for recalculation of child support.After the hearing, the district court initially recalculated child support based only on the father’s new paystubs, setting a lower obligation. The mother moved for reconsideration, providing evidence suggesting the father was self-employed with an ownership interest in his new employer, and submitted additional financial documents. The court ultimately ordered the father to produce tax returns and business records. The State calculated two potential child support amounts: one based on the father’s current income, and one imputing income based on his prior higher earnings. The district court then adopted the higher, imputed income figure, finding the father had voluntarily left his previous employment for a job with significantly less pay.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing supplemental evidence, as the parties had stipulated to provide additional financial information after the hearing. However, the Supreme Court determined that the district court failed to make necessary findings on whether the father’s employment change was made for the purpose of reducing his child support obligation, as required for income imputation under North Dakota law. The Supreme Court affirmed the use of supplemental evidence, but reversed and remanded for further findings regarding the intent behind the employment change and for an explanation of the effective date chosen for the modified child support. View "Childers v. Childers" on Justia Law

A Cass County Deputy Sheriff was investigated after an initial tip suggested he had been found viewing illegal sexual material involving minors and had threatened self-harm if reported. The sheriff’s wife and another individual were interviewed as potential sources of this claim, but neither corroborated the tip. During a voluntary interview with law enforcement, the deputy denied viewing such material but admitted to searching for explicit content involving “teen girls” and described results depicting females he estimated to be 15 or 16 years old, though he claimed not to recall if they were nude or involved in sex acts. He also admitted accessing such material at his residence, specifically using his basement television’s internet connection, and acknowledged using the TOR browser to conceal his online activity.Following these admissions, officers sought and obtained a search warrant for the deputy’s residence. They seized several electronic devices, ultimately discovering illegal sexual material on a broken cell phone. The deputy was charged with multiple counts of possessing prohibited materials and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause and did not sufficiently connect the alleged conduct to his home. The District Court of Cass County denied the suppression motion, finding probable cause supported the search.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. The court independently assessed the existence of probable cause and the nexus between the alleged criminal activity and the residence. It concluded that the deputy’s own admissions about searching for and viewing material involving underage females at his home, efforts to conceal his actions, and inconsistencies in his explanations provided a substantial basis for the search warrant. The court determined the totality of circumstances established both probable cause and a sufficient nexus to the residence. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Quam" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with continuous sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, following her disclosure of alleged abuse. He sought to introduce evidence that the accuser had engaged in an inappropriate online relationship with an adult male, including sexually explicit exchanges, arguing that she fabricated the allegations against him in retaliation for being disciplined after her mother discovered the relationship and terminated it. The defendant believed this evidence would support his theory that the accuser had a motive to lie.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, held an in camera hearing under North Dakota Rule of Evidence 412 to consider the admissibility of the proposed evidence. The court conditionally denied the defendant’s motion, finding the evidence inadmissible under Rule 412(a) and determining that the defendant had not provided a sufficient offer of proof to invoke the constitutional exception under Rule 412(b)(1)(C). The court identified foundational deficiencies in the proffered evidence and allowed limited questioning about the fact and emotional impact of discipline, but not the explicit sexual content. The jury subsequently convicted the defendant of continuous sexual abuse, and the court entered judgment.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota, the defendant argued that the exclusion of evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and constituted an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reviewed the constitutional claim de novo and the evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. It concluded that the District Court’s exclusion of the explicit evidence was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate, given the marginal probative value and the temporal gap between the events. The defendant’s confrontation rights were not violated because he was permitted to question the victim about discipline and emotional impact. The Supreme Court affirmed the criminal judgment. View "State v. Fox" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner was charged with multiple serious offenses, including several counts of gross sexual imposition, patronizing a minor for commercial sexual activity, contributing to the deprivation or delinquency of a minor, luring minors by computer, and indecent exposure. The petitioner retained counsel and was offered a plea deal by the State that included substantial but partly suspended sentences and probation. On his counsel’s advice, he rejected the offer and later entered open guilty pleas to all charges. The district court ultimately imposed consecutive and concurrent sentences that were longer than those in the rejected plea offer.After sentencing, the petitioner filed for postconviction relief in the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, seeking withdrawal of his guilty plea and a new trial. He argued that his trial counsel was ineffective, particularly for advising him to reject the plea agreement. At an evidentiary hearing, both the petitioner and his trial counsel testified about the decision-making process. The district court found that counsel’s advice was a reasonable strategic choice, that the petitioner agreed with the strategy at the time, and that there was no evidence the counsel’s performance fell below professional standards. The court denied the application for postconviction relief, and judgment was entered accordingly.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the denial of postconviction relief. Applying the two-prong Strickland v. Washington test for ineffective assistance of counsel, the court held that the district court’s finding—that counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness—was not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court also declined to consider an argument regarding a waiver of the petitioner’s presence, as it was not properly preserved in the lower court. The judgment denying postconviction relief was affirmed. View "Paola v. State" on Justia Law

The defendant worked as a controller for two related companies, handling payroll and taxes. During her employment, she was authorized to issue herself one $12,000 loan but later issued a second, unauthorized $12,000 payment. She was terminated when this was discovered. The companies’ president and CEO, as well as several employees and a hired CPA, spent significant time investigating the theft, including reviewing financial records to determine the full extent of losses. The investigation also revealed that the defendant had failed to withhold required insurance premiums from her own paychecks and that the companies had paid her unearned wages after her termination.After the defendant pled guilty to theft, the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, imposed sentence and later determined the amount of restitution. The State sought restitution for the unauthorized loan, the cost of unearned paychecks, insurance premiums not withheld, and investigative expenses. The defendant conceded liability for the unauthorized loan but challenged the inclusion of investigative expenses and insurance premiums. The district court excluded the unearned paychecks from restitution but included the investigative costs and insurance premiums, finding them directly related to the theft and reasonable in amount.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion by including investigative expenses and insurance premiums in the restitution award. The Supreme Court held that investigative expenses could be included in restitution when they are directly related to the criminal offense and are actually incurred as a direct result of that offense. The Court also held that the loss from insurance premiums not withheld from the defendant’s paychecks was directly related to her criminal conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s amended criminal judgment awarding restitution. View "State v. Engelking" on Justia Law

The case centers on a dispute over the parenting arrangement for a minor child, C.F.B., who has significant special needs, including Level 3 Autism Spectrum Disorder and other disabilities. The mother, who has been the child’s primary caregiver, sought primary residential responsibility and proposed a graduated parenting plan that initially limited the father, who had moved out of state and had limited recent contact with the child, to supervised parenting time. The father, representing himself, agreed to the mother’s primary responsibility but requested unsupervised parenting time.The District Court of Stark County, Southwest Judicial District, presided over a trial in which the court excluded the father’s medical evidence due to discovery violations. The court credited testimony from the mother and her own mother about the child’s extensive care needs and found the father’s testimony untrustworthy and unpersuasive. The court adopted the mother’s proposed graduated parenting plan, which included multiple phases with supervision and professional assessments as prerequisites for progression, and awarded her primary decision-making authority and the right to obtain a passport for the child.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s findings and orders. It held that the factual findings supporting supervised parenting time, decision-making authority, and expense-sharing were not clearly erroneous and affirmed those provisions, as well as the denial of the father’s post-judgment motions. However, the Supreme Court determined that the advancement criteria for Phases 3 and 4 of the parenting plan impermissibly delegated judicial authority to unnamed professionals without objective standards or means for judicial review. The court reversed these provisions and remanded for the establishment of objective criteria or judicial oversight. The Supreme Court also reversed the award of $500 in attorney’s fees to the mother and denied her request for appellate attorney’s fees. View "Rustan v. Ball" on Justia Law

Frank Egan brought claims alleging injury from asbestos exposure against Union Carbide Corporation and others. In an earlier lawsuit, Egan had asserted similar claims against Union Carbide, but those claims were dismissed without prejudice by stipulation. Egan then filed a new suit raising the same type of allegations, contending that the defendants placed asbestos into the stream of commerce, causing his injuries. Union Carbide, a corporation organized under New York law with its principal place of business in Texas, responded that North Dakota courts lacked personal jurisdiction over it and raised this defense in its answer.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, granted Union Carbide’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found Union Carbide did not have sufficient contacts with North Dakota to justify exercising personal jurisdiction. Egan argued that Union Carbide had waived this defense by not raising it in the prior litigation and that the company’s business registration in North Dakota constituted consent to jurisdiction, but the district court rejected these arguments.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that merely registering to do business in North Dakota does not amount to consent to general personal jurisdiction, as North Dakota law explicitly states that such registration alone is insufficient. The court further held that a defendant does not waive a personal jurisdiction defense by failing to raise it in an earlier case that was dismissed without prejudice. Finally, the act of negotiating a dismissal in the earlier litigation did not amount to the purposeful availment required by due process for establishing personal jurisdiction. Thus, the judgment dismissing Egan’s claims against Union Carbide was affirmed. View "Egan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two former spouses over the custody of their children and related attorney’s fees. After their 2021 divorce, the parties shared equal residential responsibility for their two children. In 2023, following an incident at school and a note written by one child, Kayla Reierson withheld the children from Dustin Reierson despite a social worker’s finding of no abuse or neglect. Both parties filed motions with the district court. Prior to a full hearing, they settled most issues through a partial stipulation for an amended judgment, expressly reserving the issues of contempt and attorney’s fees for the court to decide.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, held a two-day evidentiary hearing. It found Kayla Reierson in contempt for intentionally withholding the children and making a false allegation of harm. The court awarded Dustin Reierson attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,731.73—ten percent of his total fees—finding it was impossible to distinguish fees incurred for the false allegation from those incurred for other litigation. Notice of the contempt order was filed August 26, 2025, and an amended judgment was entered November 3, 2025, incorporating the contempt order and fee award. Dustin Reierson filed his notice of appeal on November 25, 2025.The Supreme Court of North Dakota concluded the appeal of the contempt order was untimely because it was not filed within sixty days as required by statute. The court further held the appeal of the attorney’s fee award was timely, as that portion was not subject to the same strict deadline. It determined Dustin Reierson had not waived his right to appeal the attorney’s fee award, and affirmed the district court’s award, finding no abuse of discretion. Kayla Reierson’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal was denied. The contempt order appeal was dismissed; the attorney’s fee award was affirmed. View "Reierson v. Reierson" on Justia Law