Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ashley Cull and Andrew Cull were married in 2013 and have two children, born in 2016 and 2019. After initiating a divorce in 2021, a stipulated judgment was entered in January 2022, with Andrew awarded primary residential responsibility for the children. An amended judgment in March 2022 reaffirmed this arrangement. In February 2025, Ashley filed a motion to modify primary residential responsibility, arguing that material changes had occurred since the prior order which warranted a shift in custody to her. She submitted declarations from herself and her parents, alleging that Andrew delegated parenting to his mother, lacked routine in his home, and made unsafe decisions affecting the children.The Northeast Judicial District Court, Pembina County, reviewed Ashley’s motion and supporting documents, along with Andrew’s fourteen counter-declarations. The district court denied Ashley’s motion, concluding that she failed to establish a prima facie case under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6, as there was no material change in circumstances nor evidence that modification was necessary to serve the children’s best interests. The court found much of Ashley’s evidence was not based on firsthand knowledge or was not competent, and that extended family involvement and Andrew’s occupation as a farmer were known factors at the time of the original custody determination.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s order de novo. It held that Ashley Cull did not provide competent evidence of a material change in circumstances or show that modification was necessary for the children's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to modify primary residential responsibility, concluding that the statutory requirements for a prima facie case were not met. View "Cull v. Cull" on Justia Law

The dispute arose after a citizen, Sanderson, served a summons and complaint on Kelley Cole, the Walsh County State’s Attorney, alleging that Cole failed to investigate crimes as required by law and deprived him of constitutional rights. Sanderson later claimed the complaint was mistakenly served and was only a draft, not intended for court filing. Cole, upon being served, filed the summons and complaint with the district court, moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and sought attorney’s fees, arguing the action was frivolous and barred by prosecutorial immunity.The District Court of Walsh County, Northeast Judicial District, reviewed the matter. Cole’s motion to dismiss was based on North Dakota’s procedural rules, which allow an action to commence upon service of summons, and permit a defendant to file the complaint. Sanderson responded by agreeing to dismiss but contested the court’s jurisdiction and objected to the lack of a hearing. The district court determined it had jurisdiction, found Sanderson had commenced the action, and concluded the complaint lacked factual allegations and was barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. The court dismissed the action, denied Sanderson’s subsequent motions, and awarded Cole attorney’s fees, finding the claims frivolous.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that jurisdiction was proper since Sanderson initiated the action by serving process, and procedural irregularities in filing did not affect substantial rights or deprive the court of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court agreed that the complaint failed to state a claim and that absolute prosecutorial immunity applied. It further upheld the finding of frivolousness and the award of attorney’s fees, determining there was no abuse of discretion or violation of procedural rights. View "Sanderson v. Cole" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with practicing law without a license after submitting court filings on behalf of another individual in a criminal case in Wells County, North Dakota. The filings included motions and related documents, each signed to indicate the defendant was representing the incarcerated individual. The State filed charges based on these actions, and after pretrial proceedings, the case proceeded to a jury trial.Prior to trial, the District Court of Wells County addressed several motions. The defendant’s motion to dismiss, based on alleged unlawful access by law enforcement to jail communications, was denied as untimely under the court’s pretrial order and applicable procedural rules. The State’s motion to amend the information to expand the offense date was granted after the court found no additional or different offense was charged and no substantial right was prejudiced. The court also ruled, over the defendant’s objection, that the offense of practicing law without a license was a strict liability crime under North Dakota law, and removed the requirement of a culpable mental state from the jury instructions. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the district court entered a criminal judgment and sentenced the defendant.On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the defendant raised several issues. The court only considered those claims that were properly preserved and sufficiently briefed. The Supreme Court found the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss as untimely, allowing amendment of the information, or removing the mens rea element from the jury instructions. The Supreme Court held that the statute under which the defendant was convicted is a strict liability offense, and the jury instructions accurately reflected the law. The criminal judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Olson" on Justia Law

Law enforcement discovered a handgun in a vehicle parked outside a bar while the defendant was inside the bar. The defendant, who was previously convicted of a qualifying offense, was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. At trial, the defendant objected to the proposed jury instructions regarding the definition of “possession,” arguing that the instructions failed to require proof of intent as allegedly mandated by recent amendments to the relevant statute. The defendant also moved for a judgment of acquittal, asserting insufficient evidence linked him to the vehicle containing the gun. The court denied the motion, and the jury returned a guilty verdict.The District Court of Ward County presided over the trial. The defendant’s objections to the jury instructions were overruled, and the motion for judgment of acquittal was denied. After conviction, the defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its jury instructions by not requiring the State to prove intent to possess the firearm and by not entering a judgment of acquittal due to insufficient evidence that the handgun qualified as a “firearm” under the law.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and held that, under the amended statute, intent is required only for convictions based on constructive possession, not for actual possession, and the district court’s jury instructions properly reflected this distinction. The Court also held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a rational fact finder to conclude the handgun was functional, as required by statute, and thus the district court did not commit obvious error by failing to enter a judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the criminal judgment. View "State v. Luetzen" on Justia Law

Authorities responded to a residence to investigate an alleged assault involving a young child. Upon arrival, social workers and a detective entered the property through an open garage door, which led to an interior entryway. The resident, Shantel Lais, allowed them inside. Once inside, the detective observed hazardous conditions, including accessible firearms, open alcohol, drugs, and drug paraphernalia within reach of a two-year-old child. As a result, Christopher Golberg was charged with child neglect, unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, and unlawful possession of a firearm.Prior to trial in the District Court of Mercer County, South Central Judicial District, Golberg moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search, arguing the detective unlawfully entered the garage without a warrant or consent, thus tainting the evidence subsequently gathered. A suppression hearing was held, where the detective testified that the garage functioned as the main entrance due to home construction and that the exterior door was open. The district court found that Golberg did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the garage under these circumstances and denied the motion to suppress. At trial, Golberg twice moved for judgment of acquittal on the basis that he did not reside at the house; both motions were denied. The jury found Golberg guilty of child neglect and not guilty on the other charges.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota considered whether the denial of the suppression motion and the sufficiency of the evidence were erroneous. The court held that the open garage, serving as the main access point and lacking express signs restricting entry, did not afford Golberg a reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, no unlawful search occurred. The court also found that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict on child neglect. The amended criminal judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Golberg" on Justia Law

This case concerns a business dispute between two individuals, Alan Weigel and Jason Albertson, regarding Veritas Crane LLC, a company providing crane and hoist services. Albertson founded Veritas in 2018, and Weigel joined the business in 2019, with both claiming at least 50% ownership. Their relationship deteriorated, leading Albertson to request the company’s bank to restrict access to its accounts due to allegations of fraudulent activity. In response, Weigel limited Albertson’s access to company facilities. Weigel then filed a complaint, naming himself and Veritas as plaintiffs, asserting both derivative claims on behalf of Veritas and direct claims against Albertson.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, reviewed the matter after Albertson moved to disqualify Weigel’s attorney, Joel Fremstad. The court found that Fremstad had a lawyer-client relationship with both Weigel and Veritas, relying on evidence such as Fremstad’s signing of pleadings for both plaintiffs and communications indicating he advised Weigel in his role as CEO of Veritas. The court concluded that this concurrent representation violated North Dakota Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a), which prohibits representation of adverse clients, and ordered Fremstad’s disqualification.The Supreme Court of North Dakota addressed Weigel’s appeal and his petition for a supervisory writ. It determined the disqualification order was not immediately appealable under statutory law or the collateral order doctrine and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Exercising its supervisory authority, the Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s order for abuse of discretion and clear error. Although it noted a harmless legal error in the district court’s reasoning regarding derivative suits, the Supreme Court held that the underlying factual findings were supported by the record. The Court denied the petition for a supervisory writ, upholding the disqualification of Fremstad. View "Weigel v. Albertson" on Justia Law

Two individuals formed a partnership to operate a business, with one contributing property and inventory, and the other providing labor, management, and assuming operational expenses. Disputes arose regarding the dissolution of the partnership and the distribution of remaining assets. The central issues concerned whether the partners had an agreement that would override the statutory default rules for capital accounts and partnership winding up, and whether one partner was entitled to a credit for “sweat equity” or an in-kind distribution of inventory.The District Court of McLean County, South Central Judicial District, initially found that the parties formed a partnership, that property was contributed, and that the partnership’s inventory was partnership property. It dismissed certain tort claims and awarded costs to one party. However, the court did not apply North Dakota’s statutory default rules for partnership dissolution and winding up. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota in Ziemann v. Grosz, 2024 ND 166, affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding with instructions for the district court to apply the statutory default winding up provisions under N.D.C.C. § 45-20-07 and to enter judgment consistent with its decision.On remand, the district court found no evidence of an agreement to vary the statutory defaults, credited the partner who contributed property with the appropriate capital credit, found no evidence of significant contributions from the other partner outside a small deposit, held that an in-kind distribution of inventory was not required, and ordered dissolution and winding up. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court properly followed its mandate, did not clearly err in its factual findings, and correctly applied the statutory provisions regarding partnership dissolution and distributions. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s remand order and judgment. View "Ziemann v. Grosz" on Justia Law

The case centers on the disappearance of Alice Queirolo in Minot, North Dakota, in December 2020. Queirolo, who was medically vulnerable due to a brain tumor and lived with two roommates, including Shawnee Krall, maintained daily contact with her family and coworkers to monitor her health. After she failed to report to work and did not respond to welfare checks, law enforcement investigated and discovered a series of circumstantial evidence including surveillance footage, witness testimony, and Krall’s behavior following her disappearance. The prosecution presented evidence suggesting that Queirolo’s disappearance was uncharacteristic, that Krall was uncooperative during the investigation, and that Krall made statements to another inmate admitting to killing the victim. There was no direct evidence, such as a body or autopsy results, due to suppression of evidence from a warrantless search.The District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, presided over a five-day jury trial. The jury found Krall guilty of intentional or knowing murder under North Dakota law. Krall was sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, Krall argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, primarily because it was circumstantial and did not conclusively tie him to Queirolo’s death. He also challenged the district court’s refusal to give his requested jury instruction that circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a rational jury to find Krall guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, reasoning that circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence. The court also held that the district court did not err in giving the standard pattern jury instruction on circumstantial evidence and explicitly overruled prior decisions requiring the “exclude every reasonable hypothesis” instruction. The conviction and judgment were affirmed. View "State v. Krall" on Justia Law

After filing a federal discrimination lawsuit against her former employer, which was dismissed, the petitioner sent emails to the employer’s counsel that led to state criminal charges for terrorizing in Cass County, North Dakota. At trial in state district court, the petitioner was convicted by a jury and sentenced to jail time with probation. During her probation, she was found to possess a firearm, resulting in revocation of probation and a new sentence.The petitioner appealed her criminal conviction to the North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing, among other things, that the State’s failure to preserve and disclose evidence constituted a Brady violation and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed her conviction. Subsequently, in the district court, the petitioner sought postconviction relief, alleging constitutional violations, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, unlawful withholding of evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel. She also moved to disqualify the presiding judge. The district court summarily dismissed her application, finding most claims barred by res judicata or misuse of process, and denied the motion for disqualification after a hearing.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s rulings. It held that the district court erred by summarily dismissing the ineffective assistance of counsel claim without an evidentiary hearing, as the State had not moved for summary disposition on those claims. The court reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on that issue. It affirmed the dismissal of the other claims, finding the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, correctly denied the motion to disqualify the judge, and properly dismissed other claims as procedurally barred or lacking merit. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the ineffective assistance claim. View "Pederson v. State" on Justia Law

A healthcare clinic and several physicians providing abortion services in North Dakota challenged the constitutionality of N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-19.1, a law criminalizing most abortions with certain exceptions. The plaintiffs argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague regarding when abortions could be performed to preserve the life or health of a pregnant woman. They asserted that the law's language failed to provide clear guidance to physicians about permissible conduct, especially given the severe criminal penalties for violations. Testimony from medical experts detailed the unpredictable and rapidly evolving risks that pregnancy can pose to a mother's health, and highlighted the difficulties in interpreting the statutory terms such as “serious health risk,” “substantial physical impairment,” and “major bodily function.”The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The court found that the statute was impermissibly vague, concluding that its unclear language chilled physicians from providing constitutionally protected medical care. The court also determined that the law infringed on pregnant women’s fundamental rights under the North Dakota Constitution and was not narrowly tailored to promote health or protect life. As a result, the court declared N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-19.1 unconstitutional and void.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s judgment. The justices issued separate opinions, but did not reach the four-member majority required by the state constitution to declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional. Therefore, the effect was that the district court’s judgment was reversed, and N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-19.1 was not declared unconstitutional. The main holding is that, due to the lack of a sufficient majority, the abortion law was not invalidated and the lower court's judgment was reversed. View "Access Independent Health Services, Inc. v. Wrigley" on Justia Law