Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves a defendant who was alleged to have sexually assaulted a woman near the Red River in Fargo, North Dakota. The prosecution charged him with gross sexual imposition (GSI) by sexual contact, attempted GSI by sexual act, felonious restraint, and preventing arrest. At trial, the victim testified that the defendant forced her to the ground, pulled down her pants, and attempted but failed to penetrate her anus, while also engaging in other sexual contact. The jury was instructed to unanimously agree on the specific acts underlying each charge but was not required to specify which acts supported each conviction. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts.Following the verdict, the District Court of Cass County sentenced the defendant to concurrent 20-year terms for GSI and attempted GSI, along with additional time for the other convictions. The defendant objected to being sentenced on both GSI and attempted GSI, arguing this constituted double jeopardy because both charges stemmed from the same criminal conduct. The court also declined to award good time credit for pretrial detention, reasoning that the defendant’s conduct while in jail did not merit such credit.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the double jeopardy clause was violated and whether the defendant was entitled to good time credit for pretrial detention. The court held that imposing sentences for both GSI and attempted GSI violated the prohibition against double jeopardy, as the convictions could have been based on the same act, and the attempt merged into the completed offense. However, the court held that the defendant was not eligible for good time credit before sentencing. As a result, the Supreme Court of North Dakota vacated the sentence for attempted GSI and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "State v. Baker" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were married in 2013 and separated in 2023, sharing three school-age children. The marital home, located on the husband’s family farmstead in Pleasant Lake, North Dakota, was occupied by the wife and children after separation, while the husband moved to Rugby, North Dakota. The wife initiated divorce proceedings seeking primary residential responsibility for the children, and the husband counterclaimed for either primary or equal residential responsibility. Both parties submitted proposed parenting plans, with the husband also presenting an alternative plan for extended summer parenting time in the event he was not awarded primary responsibility. The husband additionally sought the marital home, proposing alternative asset distributions.After a bench trial, the District Court of Benson County awarded the wife primary residential responsibility, denied the husband extended summer parenting time, and awarded the marital home to the wife without detailed explanation. The husband appealed. In a prior decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, instructing the district court to provide a reasoned explanation for its decisions on residential responsibility, parenting time, and property distribution. On remand, the district court supplemented its findings but again awarded primary residential responsibility and the marital home to the wife and denied extended summer parenting time, offering explanations that the Supreme Court found inconsistent and insufficient.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court failed to adequately follow its prior mandate, as the supplemental findings were inconsistent with earlier findings and lacked specific explanations for key decisions, especially regarding summer parenting time and the marital home’s distribution. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings before a different judge, directing the new judge to provide detailed findings on residential responsibility, summer parenting time, and property distribution, and to promptly address proposals for extended summer parenting time. View "Shively v. Shively" on Justia Law

A group of affiliated energy companies brought a civil case in North Dakota against several environmental organizations and individuals, alleging a coordinated campaign—sometimes involving unlawful acts—targeted at their pipeline operations. After six years of litigation, a three-week jury trial resulted in a unanimous verdict for the energy companies, awarding over $130 million in compensatory and exemplary damages against one defendant, Greenpeace International, and over $666 million against all Greenpeace entities combined. The jury found Greenpeace International liable for conspiracy, defamation, defamation per se, and tortious interference, but not for property-related torts.While the North Dakota case was pending, Greenpeace International initiated legal proceedings in the Netherlands, seeking relief under Dutch and European anti-SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) laws. The Dutch action alleged, among other things, that the North Dakota suit was a SLAPP case and sought to declare it “manifestly unfounded,” potentially undermining the North Dakota verdict. The energy companies sought an antisuit injunction in North Dakota District Court to prevent Greenpeace International from proceeding with the Dutch litigation. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the Dutch and North Dakota cases involved different issues because anti-SLAPP actions are not recognized under North Dakota law, and thus did not meet the threshold for an antisuit injunction. The district court also found that the Dutch action was not vexatious, did not threaten North Dakota policy, and did not implicate comity concerns.On review, the Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that the district court abused its discretion by misapplying the legal framework for antisuit injunctions. The Supreme Court held that the issues in both cases were substantially similar, as the Dutch action, as pleaded, would require relitigating questions already decided by the North Dakota jury. The Court adopted a “conservative” approach to comity, weighing respect for foreign tribunals against the need to protect the integrity of state proceedings. The Supreme Court granted the petition for a supervisory writ and remanded the case, directing the district court to enter a narrowly tailored antisuit injunction preventing Greenpeace International from pursuing any Dutch claims that would require a finding that the North Dakota case lacked legal foundation, while permitting claims based on matters not adjudicated in North Dakota. View "Energy Transfer v. Gion" on Justia Law

A dispute arose regarding ownership of surface and mineral interests along the Yellowstone River near the North Dakota-Montana border. The land in question included two areas known as the “North Island” and the “West Bank.” Whiting Oil and Gas Corporation, a well operator, initiated an interpleader action to determine the rightful owners of oil and gas interests. The State of North Dakota later filed a quiet title action to adjudicate ownership of the same lands, including surface rights. The parties stipulated to the location of the ordinary high water mark and provided evidence about how the disputed lands were formed, focusing on whether their formation resulted from gradual accretion or sudden avulsive events.The District Court of McKenzie County bifurcated the proceedings. After trial, the court found the Yellowstone River was navigable at statehood. The court determined the State did not own the North Island, concluding it was formed by an avulsive event that separated farmland from the shore, not by accretion in the riverbed. The court initially determined the State owned the West Bank as it had formed as an in-channel island that later attached to the west bank. On summary judgment, however, the district court ruled that a 1950 deed from the State to Norby conveyed the West Bank, interpreting the lots’ western boundary to be the state line rather than the river. The court rejected defenses of laches and statute of limitations.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the district court’s finding that the North Island formed by avulsion was not clearly erroneous and affirmed that the State does not own the North Island. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the West Bank was never part of the government lots conveyed by the State’s deed, so the State retains ownership of the West Bank. The judgment was affirmed in part as to the North Island and reversed in part as to the West Bank. View "State v. Leland" on Justia Law

A woman was discovered inside a Minot, North Dakota residence by one of its occupants, who awoke to find her, a stranger, in his bedroom. Upon confronting her, he noticed her wearing mismatched Adidas shoes, and she emptied her pockets to reveal prescription medications and car keys belonging to the residents. After the woman fled, the residents found their home in disarray and discovered $1,600 in rent money and several pieces of gold jewelry missing from a secret compartment in a drawer. Shortly after, police located a woman matching the description, wearing the same shoes, who admitted to taking a gold ring and the shoes. She was identified as Winona Keplin.Keplin was charged with burglary and theft of property in the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District. Pursuant to a plea agreement, she pled guilty to burglary and the theft charge was dismissed. The State sought restitution for the missing cash and jewelry, and, after a hearing, the district court found the State’s witnesses credible and ordered Keplin to pay $5,882 in restitution, reflecting the value of the missing items.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion by awarding restitution for items not found on Keplin at her arrest. The Supreme Court applied a standard similar to abuse of discretion, affirming that findings of fact are not set aside unless clearly erroneous. The court distinguished this case from prior decisions where the causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the loss was lacking. Here, the court found sufficient evidence of a direct connection between Keplin’s burglary and the victims’ losses. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the amended criminal judgment ordering restitution. View "State v. Keplin" on Justia Law

Three children were removed multiple times from the home of their parents, S.S. and T.C., due to concerns about drug use and domestic violence. Initially, two children were removed in 2018, and all three children were subsequently placed in and out of care between 2018 and 2023. After a guardianship arrangement expired in 2023, law enforcement again found evidence of drug use in S.S.’s home, leading to another removal of the children in early 2024. The children were placed in the care of the Mountrail McKenzie Human Service Zone (MMHSZ).The State petitioned in 2025 to terminate the parental rights of both S.S. and T.C. Following a trial, the Juvenile Court of McKenzie County, Northwest Judicial District, found that the children were in need of protection and had been in care for the statutory number of nights required under North Dakota law. The juvenile court issued an order terminating S.S.’s parental rights. S.S. appealed, arguing that the juvenile court abused its discretion by not making a specific finding that reasonable efforts were made to reunify him with his children.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that, under the relevant statutes, a specific finding on reasonable efforts to reunify is not required at the time of termination of parental rights when the statutory criteria of need for protection and number of nights in care are met. The court further concluded that the juvenile court’s findings demonstrated sufficient consideration of the efforts made by social services and that its decision to terminate S.S.’s parental rights was not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination order. View "Interest of W.S." on Justia Law

A dispute arose concerning the residential responsibility and decision-making authority for a young child, M.R.M.-B., born to two unmarried parents, Monkman and Binney. After an incident in which Monkman withheld the child from Binney and the child was found with bruising and signs of neglect, Cass County Human Service Zone removed the child from both parents and placed her with the Hackmanns, who served as foster parents for approximately two years. Following the juvenile court’s decision to return the child to her parents, the Hackmanns sought to intervene and obtain residential responsibility, asserting they were psychological parents. Meanwhile, Binney and Monkman filed competing motions regarding residential responsibility and support.The District Court of Cass County first denied, then later granted, the Hackmanns’ motion to intervene, determining that the Uniform Nonparent Custody and Visitation Act (N.D.C.C. ch. 14-09.4) was not the exclusive means for nonparents to seek custody, and that an equitable claim as psychological parents was cognizable. After hearings, the district court awarded the Hackmanns primary residential responsibility and sole decision-making authority for the child, subject to Monkman’s supervised parenting time and Binney’s unsupervised time. Monkman appealed, challenging the award to the Hackmanns, the restriction on his parenting time, and the calculation of child support.The Supreme Court of North Dakota concluded that, under N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-02(3), a nonparent whose relationship with a child is based solely on foster parent status may not be found to be a psychological parent. It found the Hackmanns’ relationship with M.R.M.-B. was solely as foster parents and that the district court’s finding to the contrary was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the amended judgment, denied the Hackmanns’ request for attorney’s fees, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Interest of M.R.M." on Justia Law

After police received information that Jeffrey Simpson had made threats to “shoot it out with police” and possessed a handgun, a SWAT team was deployed to arrest him at his workplace. When officers confronted Simpson, he failed to comply with commands, was struck by a less-lethal projectile, and responded by firing two or three rounds at the officers before his firearm jammed. Simpson attempted to clear the malfunction, reloaded his weapon, fired an additional round into the ground, and then surrendered. He was charged with multiple offenses related to both the shooting incident and prior events.Simpson pleaded guilty to several charges, including burglary, domestic violence, and drug possession, in Grand Forks County District Court. He proceeded to a jury trial on four counts of attempted murder and three counts of reckless endangerment. The jury found Simpson guilty on all remaining charges. After sentencing, a criminal judgment was entered against him.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota, Simpson contended that the jury’s verdicts on the attempted murder counts were legally inconsistent and that there was insufficient evidence to support convictions on all four counts, given the limited number of shots fired. The Supreme Court held that the jury instructions correctly stated the law and that the definition of “substantial step” for attempted murder did not require separate shots for each named officer. The Court found no legal inconsistency in the verdicts and concluded that sufficient evidence supported the convictions under the deferential standard of review. The Court affirmed the criminal judgment but ordered the district court clerk to correct a clerical error regarding which counts Simpson pleaded guilty to and which were decided by jury verdict. View "State v. Simpson" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with domestic violence, a class B misdemeanor, after an incident on September 18, 2024. During pretrial proceedings, she requested an evaluation of her fitness to proceed, which led to delays as she alternately authorized and withdrew consent for the release of her medical records. The situation was further complicated by her involvement in other pending criminal cases. After missing a hearing and further delays in obtaining the evaluation, the court issued a bench warrant to secure her presence for the evaluation, which ultimately found her fit to proceed. Following additional continuances and attorney substitutions, a jury found her guilty, and she was sentenced to 30 days in jail, with credit for time served.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, managed the proceedings. At no point did the court find that the defendant was unfit to proceed; instead, the proceedings were delayed due to the complications surrounding the fitness evaluation and her cooperation. The defendant did not raise the issue of delay or seek dismissal under North Dakota statutes or procedural rules until her appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case on appeal. The defendant argued that the case should have been dismissed because the period for suspending proceedings under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-08(2) or for undue delay under N.D.R.Crim.P. 48 had been exceeded. The Supreme Court held that the statutory dismissal deadline was never triggered because the district court had not found the defendant lacked fitness to proceed. The Court also found that Rule 48 did not provide a clear legal basis for dismissal under the circumstances and that there was no showing of prejudice. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "State v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

A parent applied to a state-run program providing compensation for family members who give extraordinary care to individuals with significant medical needs. The applicant’s young child required extensive daily assistance due to chronic health issues. The Department of Health and Human Services denied the application, explaining that the child’s score on a standardized assessment, created internally by the Department, did not meet the minimum threshold to qualify for the program. The assessment assigned points based on responses to a set of questions about the child’s needs, and only those scoring at least fifty percent of possible points for their age group were deemed eligible.After the application was denied, the parent pursued an administrative appeal. The administrative law judge upheld the denial, finding that, under the Department’s rules, only the assessment score determined eligibility for “extraordinary care,” and other medical details were not considered. The Department adopted this finding in a final order and denied a rehearing. The parent then appealed to the District Court of Burleigh County, which affirmed the Department’s decision.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the Department could use the assessment and its scoring rubric to determine eligibility, even though these criteria had not been formally promulgated as administrative rules. The Court held that because these tools operated as binding eligibility requirements of general applicability, they were rules under North Dakota’s Administrative Agencies Practice Act and should have been formally adopted through the rulemaking process. The Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Ferderer v. NDDHHS" on Justia Law