Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves Laura Cote and Adam Cote, who were divorced in November 2022. The divorce agreement prohibited exposing their children to felons and known sex offenders. However, Laura Cote began dating Steven Alexander, a convicted sex offender, in August 2022. In April 2023, Adam Cote filed a motion to modify residential responsibility and sought a contempt sanction against Laura Cote for violating the terms of the judgment by allowing Alexander to be around the children. He also filed a motion to compel discovery seeking communications between Laura Cote and Alexander and Laura Cote’s bank statements.The District Court of Ward County found Laura Cote in contempt of court for allowing and encouraging contact between the children and Alexander. However, the court denied Adam Cote’s motion for primary residential responsibility, deeming it an "extreme remedy." Instead, the court ordered that the children have no contact with Alexander and warned Laura Cote of significant consequences for non-compliance. The court also denied Adam Cote’s motion to compel discovery.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Adam Cote appealed the district court's orders denying his motion to modify residential responsibility and motion to compel discovery. Laura Cote cross-appealed the order finding her in contempt of court. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in part, agreeing that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Adam Cote’s motion to compel discovery or in finding Laura Cote in contempt of court. However, the Supreme Court found that the district court failed to make necessary findings regarding the best interest factors for the Supreme Court to provide a meaningful review of the district court’s denial of a modification of primary residential responsibility. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case with instructions to provide findings on the best interests of the children. View "Cote v. Cote" on Justia Law

Scott Dahms hired Legacy Plumbing, LLC to perform plumbing work in a house built in the 1920s. Due to the age and condition of the piping, Legacy recommended replacing as much of the piping as possible. Dahms, however, wanted to keep costs low and did not want additional piping replaced. After Legacy completed the work, Dahms discovered a leak in the bathroom, which caused damage to the home. Dahms filed a lawsuit in small claims court for the cost to repair the damage from the leak. Legacy removed the case to district court, filed an answer, and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Legacy and dismissed Dahms’s claim.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Legacy, concluding that there was no genuine issue of fact as to the source and cause of the leak. The court relied on affidavits and photographs provided by Legacy, which asserted that the source of the leak was the original lead and Oakum joint seal inside the main cast iron stack, not the PVC piping or hub part installed by Legacy. The court also concluded that the damage due to the leak was an incidental under the warranty clause of the contract between Dahms and Legacy.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's decision, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the source and cause of the leak. The court found that the district court had improperly weighed the evidence and determined witness credibility by considering the experience of the affiants. The Supreme Court also found that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the damage was incidental to Legacy’s work under the agreement. The court denied Legacy's request for attorney’s fees and remanded the case back to the district court. View "Dahms v. Legacy Plumbing" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed a case involving Donovan Meuchel, a member of Red Trail Energy, LLC, who requested information from the company after it solicited bids for a project and his company's bid was unsuccessful. Meuchel claimed a right to the information under state law, but Red Trail argued that he was not entitled to the information as it was not material to his rights and duties as a member of the company. The District Court sided with Red Trail, and Meuchel appealed.The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the court had not erred in denying Meuchel's request for information or in awarding attorney’s fees to Red Trail. The court explained that under North Dakota's Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, a member of an LLC has a right to any record or information that is material to the member's rights and duties or any other information, unless the demand is unreasonable or improper. In this context, information is considered "material" if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable decision maker would consider it important.The court found that Meuchel had not shown that the information he sought was material to his rights and duties as a Red Trail member. Furthermore, the court determined that Red Trail's refusal to provide information on the bidding process was not unreasonable, given that disclosure could have negatively impacted the company's financial status and reputation. The court also found that Meuchel had failed to make a good faith effort to resolve the discovery dispute outside of court, which justified the award of attorney’s fees to Red Trail. View "Meuchel v. Red Trail Energy" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Ryan Kratz, who had entered into a purchase agreement to buy a business and building from Donald and Carol McIlravy, failed to make the agreed-upon payments. The McIlravys initiated two eviction actions, and a separate action seeking damages, cancellation of the contract, and release of funds held in a trust account. The district court initially dismissed one of the eviction actions, but eventually ruled in favor of the McIlravys, awarding them damages and ordering release of the trust funds. Several years later, Kratz filed a motion under Rule 60(b), alleging the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the eviction actions and seeking to vacate or void all findings, conclusions, and orders, except the dismissals of the eviction actions. The district court denied this motion and awarded attorney’s fees to the McIlravys.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that Kratz's appeal was limited to the judgment denying his Rule 60(b) motion and that the motion was timely. The court determined that the district court had jurisdiction over the eviction cases and that any violation of N.D.R.Ct. 7.1(b)(1) was harmless error. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court. View "Don's Garden Center v. The Garden District" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Derrick Sherwood appealed a district court order denying his motion to vacate a domestic violence protection order (DVPO) under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60. The court held a hearing and entered a DVPO restraining Derrick Sherwood from having contact with Valerie Sherwood, his ex-wife, and their two minor children. The order also required Derrick Sherwood to surrender his firearms to law enforcement. Later, the court amended the DVPO to remove the restriction on Derrick Sherwood’s possession of firearms. Derrick Sherwood later moved to vacate the DVPO altogether.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Derrick Sherwood’s request to treat Valerie Sherwood as a hostile witness or in denying Derrick Sherwood’s motion to vacate the DVPO. The court also held that the district court did not err in awarding Valerie Sherwood attorney’s fees.Furthermore, the court held that Derrick Sherwood did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02(4)(g), which allows a DVPO to require, under certain circumstances, that the respondent surrender any firearm or other specified dangerous weapon. As the DVPO was amended to allow Derrick Sherwood to possess firearms, he did not have a justiciable controversy regarding the constitutionality of this statute.The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Sherwood v. Sherwood" on Justia Law

In this case, GayLe Schleve, the personal representative of the estates of Viola J. Heath and Caleb C. Heath, appealed orders from the District Court of Dunn County, North Dakota, that granted Wells Fargo Bank's motions to vacate previous orders establishing the authority of domiciliary foreign personal representatives and letters testamentary related to the estate of Viola J. Heath, and determining heirs and successors in the estate of Caleb C. Heath.Viola and Caleb Heath were residents of Montana who owned mineral rights in Dunn County, North Dakota. After their deaths, litigation ensued over the distribution of these mineral rights. The orders being challenged in this appeal had resulted in the mineral rights being transferred to the heirs of Viola Heath.Wells Fargo, as successor to Norwest Capital Management & Trust Co., the trustee appointed in Caleb Heath's will, claimed an ownership interest in the mineral rights and challenged the transfer of those rights to the heirs of Viola Heath. Wells Fargo argued that the district court had lacked jurisdiction to issue the orders, and that the orders should be vacated because they were manifestly unjust and based on incorrect applications of the law.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that Wells Fargo had standing to challenge the orders. The court also held that the district court had erred in ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the order in the Estate of Viola J. Heath. However, the Supreme Court remanded for further determination of whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over the parties in the Estate of Viola J. Heath, and whether relief should be granted under Rule 60(b)(4) or Rule 60(b)(6).Finally, the Supreme Court held that the district court had abused its discretion in granting Wells Fargo's Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate the order in the Estate of Caleb C. Heath without sufficient findings related to timeliness. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of Heath" on Justia Law

In a legal malpractice case in North Dakota, a couple, Kenneth and Carol Pinks, sued attorney Alexander Kelsch and his professional corporation, along with associated partners, alleging negligence in representing them in a quiet title action against the State of North Dakota. The District Court, South Central Judicial District, bifurcated the malpractice action to first determine the element of causation, specifically whether the Pinks would have achieved a more favorable outcome in the quiet title action but for the alleged negligence of the defendants. The court denied cross-motions for summary judgment, finding there were genuine issues of material fact.Following a bench trial on the causation element, the district court concluded that had the evidence of the Pinks’ ownership of the disputed land been presented in the quiet title action, they would have established their ownership claim was prior and superior to the State’s claim of title. The court concluded the Pinks proved the element of causation and ordered a jury trial be set on the remaining issues of the legal malpractice claim. The defendants appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of North Dakota, however, dismissed the appeal, ruling that the defendants were attempting to appeal from an interlocutory order, and the defendants did not seek certification under Rule 54(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule requires that, in cases with more than one claim or multiple parties, a final judgment on one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties can only be directed if the court expressly determines there is no just reason for delay. The court found that the district court only ruled on the causation element of the legal malpractice claim, and other elements, such as the existence of an attorney-client relationship, a duty by the attorney to the client, a breach of that duty by the attorney, and damages were still left to be adjudicated. The defendants' failure to comply with Rule 54(b) led to the dismissal of the appeal. The court also denied the Pinks' request for costs and attorney’s fees, determining that the defendants' appeal was not frivolously made. View "Pinks v. Kelsch" on Justia Law

In North Dakota, Friends of the Rail Bridge (FORB), Downtown Business Association of Bismarck (DBAB), and CD Holdings, LLC appealed from a judgment dismissing their administrative appeal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case arose when BNSF Railway Company applied for permits to construct a new rail bridge and remove the existing rail bridge across the Missouri River. FORB and DBAB requested the Department of Water Resources (DWR) to conduct a public hearing or meeting regarding the permits. After the permits were issued, FORB, DBAB, and CD Holdings appealed to the district court. The court dismissed the appeal, concluding they did not request a hearing under N.D.C.C. § 61-03-22, therefore it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in an opinion written by Justice McEvers, affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to perfect their appeal and the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because the appellants did not request a hearing within 30 days after DWR’s issuance of the permits. Therefore, no hearing was held, nor was a hearing request denied by DWR. The court further clarified that the public meetings held were not hearings under N.D.C.C. § 61-03-22 and should not be confused with adjudicative proceedings. View "Friends of the Rail Bridge v. Dep't of Water Resources" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota considered an appeal by Michelle Vetter against a district court judgment which found her liable for unpaid legal fees to Larson Latham Huettl LLP, a law firm she'd hired for her divorce proceedings. The firm had sued Vetter for a balance of $552 which exceeded an initial retainer of $6,000. Vetter disputed the claim, arguing that the firm had unilaterally altered the agreement's terms, breached the contract, and committed fraud or deceit. She alleged she'd been billed at $200 per hour instead of the agreed $180. The district court dismissed Vetter's counterclaim, upheld the validity and enforceability of the fee agreement (which included a provision that the hourly rate could increase during representation), and awarded judgment to the law firm for the unpaid fees, interest, costs, and attorney’s fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision, finding that its conclusions were supported by the record and not clearly erroneous. The court ruled that attorney's fees were reasonable and enforceable under the contract. The court also remanded the case to the district court to determine a reasonable amount for attorney’s fees for the appeal, as per the North Dakota Century Code, which allows a prevailing plaintiff to be awarded attorney’s fees when the defendant elects to remove the action from small claims court to district court and appeals the district court judgment to the supreme court. View "Vetter v. Larson Latham Huettl LLP" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, Wilmot Yalartai, the plaintiff and appellant, appealed against an order dismissing his case against Jamesetta Miller, the respondent. The two are married with minor children and Yalartai had filed two cases against Miller - one for parenting responsibility and the other for divorce. After a hearing, a judicial referee dismissed the parenting responsibility case, stating that issues concerning parenting responsibility could be resolved in the divorce case. The referee's dismissal order was given without notice to the parties, and Yalartai appealed against this order.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota, in its decision, stated that the dismissal order is not appealable under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02 because it was issued without notice. Thus, the court dismissed Yalartai's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02(7), orders issued without notice to the parties are not appealable and litigants must first seek relief in the district court from an order made without notice. The court further explained that an adversarial record, which does not exist in this case, is required for their review. Hence, Yalartai's failure to seek relief from the dismissal order as required by law led to the dismissal of his appeal. View "Yalartai v. Miller" on Justia Law