Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tevin Dewayne Freeman was charged with the murder of Erica L. Herrera, a class AA felony, in October 2020. The case was brought to trial in November 2022. The prosecution's witnesses included the 911 dispatcher who received Freeman's emergency call, law enforcement officers who responded to the scene and investigated Herrera's death, the medical examiner who conducted Herrera's autopsy, and a mutual friend of Freeman and Herrera. The medical examiner testified that Herrera's injuries were inconsistent with self-inflicted or accident-related injuries and that she died from blunt force trauma. Freeman claimed that Herrera's injuries were from a fall. After the prosecution rested its case, Freeman moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. The defense did not call any witnesses.During the defense's closing argument, the prosecution objected to the defense counsel's use of "I believe" statements. This led to a sidebar conference, after which the court was informed that a juror needed a break. The court allowed a ten-minute recess. After the recess, Freeman moved for a mistrial, arguing that the break and the prosecution's objection during closing argument prejudiced him. The court denied Freeman's motion for a mistrial. The jury found Freeman guilty of murder, and judgment was entered in June 2023.On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Freeman argued that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial. He claimed that the break during the defense's closing argument showed indifference to the defense's case and that no curative jury instruction could remedy the situation. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision, stating that Freeman had not shown that allowing a short break in the defense's closing argument at the request of a juror to use the restroom was a manifest injustice or that the district court abused its discretion. Freeman also argued that the convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence regarding the culpability element of intentionally or knowingly. The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to draw a reasonable inference that Freeman intentionally or knowingly committed the charged offense. View "State v. Freeman" on Justia Law

In April 2021, Jaime Urrabazo was found guilty of delivering a controlled substance by a jury. While his appeal was pending, Urrabazo filed his first application for postconviction relief, which was dismissed after he failed to attend the hearing. In April 2023, Urrabazo filed a second application for postconviction relief, arguing that the jury in his trial was not unanimous because one juror's response during the polling of the jury was inaudible on the recording.The District Court of Cass County denied Urrabazo's second application for postconviction relief. The court found that Urrabazo had misused the process by failing to raise his claim about the lack of jury unanimity in his first postconviction proceeding. The court also found that Urrabazo's trial counsel was objectively reasonable for not moving for a mistrial after the jury polling, and that Urrabazo's appellate counsel was objectively reasonable in not raising the issue of jury unanimity on appeal.Urrabazo appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that the district court erred in finding his application for postconviction relief was a misuse of process and that his counsel was not ineffective. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Urrabazo's second petition for postconviction relief was not a misuse of process and that his counsels' representation was objectively reasonable. The court concluded that Urrabazo had not shown that the jury was not unanimous and that his counsels' representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. View "Urrabazo v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Keisha Kemmet and Lindell Kemmet, who were married in September 2016 and separated in June 2021. The main issues in the case revolve around the distribution of marital property following their divorce. Keisha Kemmet argues that the district court's distribution of marital property was not equitable, the court's valuation of land was clearly erroneous, and the court's computations contain errors. Lindell Kemmet cross-appeals, arguing that the court's valuations of his remainder interest in his family's homestead, personal property items, and his dental practice were clearly erroneous. He also argues that the distribution of marital property is not equitable, the provision regarding health insurance is ambiguous, and the court abused its discretion by failing to allow for cross-examination of Keisha Kemmet’s expert witness.The district court had valued the parties' property and debts and made an equitable distribution. Both parties presented testimony regarding the valuation of the land and the dental practice. The district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment and judgment. Both parties appealed.The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court's valuation of the Kidder County property and the dental practice was not clearly erroneous. The court's valuations of these items were within the range of the evidence presented. However, the court's execution of the distribution created confusion and required clarification. The Supreme Court remanded the issue for proper accounting of the distribution of the marital estate. The court also found that the district court's finding of an equitable distribution of 40% to Keisha Kemmet in a short-term marriage was not clearly erroneous. The court's findings and distributions were supported by the record. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in all other respects, except for the court's findings regarding the valuation and distribution of the Kidder County property, which must be clarified and its distributions reconsidered. View "Kemmet v. Kemmet" on Justia Law

The case involves Laura Cote and Adam Cote, who were divorced in November 2022. The divorce agreement prohibited exposing their children to felons and known sex offenders. However, Laura Cote began dating Steven Alexander, a convicted sex offender, in August 2022. In April 2023, Adam Cote filed a motion to modify residential responsibility and sought a contempt sanction against Laura Cote for violating the terms of the judgment by allowing Alexander to be around the children. He also filed a motion to compel discovery seeking communications between Laura Cote and Alexander and Laura Cote’s bank statements.The District Court of Ward County found Laura Cote in contempt of court for allowing and encouraging contact between the children and Alexander. However, the court denied Adam Cote’s motion for primary residential responsibility, deeming it an "extreme remedy." Instead, the court ordered that the children have no contact with Alexander and warned Laura Cote of significant consequences for non-compliance. The court also denied Adam Cote’s motion to compel discovery.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Adam Cote appealed the district court's orders denying his motion to modify residential responsibility and motion to compel discovery. Laura Cote cross-appealed the order finding her in contempt of court. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in part, agreeing that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Adam Cote’s motion to compel discovery or in finding Laura Cote in contempt of court. However, the Supreme Court found that the district court failed to make necessary findings regarding the best interest factors for the Supreme Court to provide a meaningful review of the district court’s denial of a modification of primary residential responsibility. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case with instructions to provide findings on the best interests of the children. View "Cote v. Cote" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a plea agreement between the State and Michael Brenum in a criminal case. The court ordered a pre-plea presentence investigation (PSI) and combined the change of plea and sentencing hearing. The risk assessment score from the PSI triggered a secondary phase of the assessment, which was referred to the North Dakota Department of Health and Human Services (Department) and Dr. Hein-Kolo. They refused to approve the secondary process of the assessment based on a pre-plea PSI, arguing that the risk assessment process should be used only after a conviction has occurred according to assessment guidelines. The district court held the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo in contempt for not completing the risk assessment.The Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo petitioned the Supreme Court of North Dakota to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a supervisory writ, arguing that the district court misinterpreted the law by ordering a risk assessment before acceptance of a guilty plea and that there is no other adequate remedy. They also argued that the issue is not appealable and no adequate alternative remedy exists.The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo, stating that the plain language of the statute gives the Department the authority to approve the secondary process of the risk assessment and the responsibility to perform that secondary process. The court also clarified that a risk assessment is conducted on “a person that committed an offense,” and a person is considered to have committed an offense only after a conviction. The court concluded that the district court may order a PSI at any time, but it may not require the Department to perform the risk assessment other than by its approved process or before the substantive requirements are met. The Supreme Court of North Dakota exercised its supervisory jurisdiction and vacated the district court’s order directing the Department to conduct a pre-plea risk assessment and the order holding the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo in contempt. View "State v. Thornton" on Justia Law

Scott Dahms hired Legacy Plumbing, LLC to perform plumbing work in a house built in the 1920s. Due to the age and condition of the piping, Legacy recommended replacing as much of the piping as possible. Dahms, however, wanted to keep costs low and did not want additional piping replaced. After Legacy completed the work, Dahms discovered a leak in the bathroom, which caused damage to the home. Dahms filed a lawsuit in small claims court for the cost to repair the damage from the leak. Legacy removed the case to district court, filed an answer, and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Legacy and dismissed Dahms’s claim.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Legacy, concluding that there was no genuine issue of fact as to the source and cause of the leak. The court relied on affidavits and photographs provided by Legacy, which asserted that the source of the leak was the original lead and Oakum joint seal inside the main cast iron stack, not the PVC piping or hub part installed by Legacy. The court also concluded that the damage due to the leak was an incidental under the warranty clause of the contract between Dahms and Legacy.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's decision, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the source and cause of the leak. The court found that the district court had improperly weighed the evidence and determined witness credibility by considering the experience of the affiants. The Supreme Court also found that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the damage was incidental to Legacy’s work under the agreement. The court denied Legacy's request for attorney’s fees and remanded the case back to the district court. View "Dahms v. Legacy Plumbing" on Justia Law

Whitetail Wave LLC, a Montana Limited Liability Company, sued XTO Energy, Inc., a Delaware corporation, the Board of University and School Lands of the State of North Dakota, the State of North Dakota, and the Department of Water Resources and its Director. Whitetail Wave claimed ownership of certain property in McKenzie County, North Dakota, and alleged that XTO Energy had breached their lease agreement by failing to make required royalty payments. Whitetail Wave also claimed that the State's assertion of an interest in the mineral interests associated with the property constituted an unconstitutional taking without just compensation.The District Court of McKenzie County granted summary judgment in favor of the State and XTO Energy. The court concluded that the State owned certain mineral interests within the ordinary high watermark as defined by North Dakota law. The court also found that XTO Energy was within the safe harbor provision provided by North Dakota law and did not breach the parties’ lease agreement when it withheld the royalty payments. The court awarded XTO Energy recovery of its attorney’s fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the judgment of the district court. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in dismissing Whitetail Wave's claim of an unconstitutional taking against the State, as the State's actions were limited to a title dispute. The Supreme Court also found that the district court did not err in dismissing Whitetail Wave's claim against XTO Energy for the non-payment of royalties, as XTO Energy fell within the safe harbor provision of North Dakota law. Finally, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in awarding XTO Energy a recovery of its attorney’s fees as the prevailing party. View "Whitetail Wave v. XTO Energy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision in a case involving Defendant Joseph Glaum, who appealed an amended criminal judgment and the denial of his request to withdraw his conditional guilty pleas. Glaum claimed that the court had abused its discretion in denying his request to withdraw his pleas, arguing that the court had misapplied the factors for considering a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11. He also made claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and asserted that the six issues preserved for appeal by his conditional pleas were wrongly decided by the court.The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the factors outlined in State v. Lium, and did not clearly err in determining that Glaum did not meet his burden to show a fair and just reason to withdraw his conditional guilty pleas. The court also concluded that the record was inadequate to determine Glaum’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.Glaum further argued that his right to a speedy trial under the federal constitution was violated. The court applied the balancing test announced in Barker v. Wingo to evaluate this claim, considering the accused’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, and whether there was any prejudice to the accused. Upon balancing these factors, the court found that Glaum had not shown a violation of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.Finally, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant the State’s motion to amend the information and denied Glaum’s motion for continuance, finding that the court did not act in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or misinterpret or misapply the law. View "State v. Glaum" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the ownership of mineral royalty interests in land in McKenzie County, North Dakota. The plaintiff, Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., operates several oil and gas wells on pooled spacing units, which include land owned by the defendant, Greggory Tank. Tank argued that Petro-Hunt had wrongly distributed less than the full well revenues due to him and other defendants based on five assignments executed in 1937.The Supreme Court of North Dakota upheld the district court's decision, concluding that the court correctly determined that the five 1937 assignments burdened Tank’s southwest quarter mineral interest in the subject property. The court further concluded that Tank was not entitled to an accounting under N.D.C.C. § 38-08-09.4(3) and failed to establish that Petro-Hunt was a fiduciary. The court also concluded that Tank did not provide any basis for holding a fiduciary duty exists under the facts and circumstances of this case.The court rejected Tank's argument that he has a statutory right to an accounting under N.D.C.C. § 38-08-08(1) and N.D.C.C. § 38-08-09.4(3), stating that these provisions do not apply to this case. The court further noted that Tank did not demonstrate the Industrial Commission unitized his interests under sections 38-08-09.1 through 38-08-09.16. Therefore, N.D.C.C. § 38-08-09.4(3) and its accounting requirements for a unitized area do not apply in this case.The court's decision affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Petro-Hunt v. Tank" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the decision of the District Court of Ramsey County in a case involving a man, James Driver, who was charged with fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, reckless endangerment, and driving under suspension or revocation. Driver appealed his conviction, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove he was the operator of the vehicle involved in the chase and that the vehicle was driven in a way that showed extreme indifference to human life. He also argued that the State had presented irrelevant evidence and made an improper opening statement about dismissed theft and trespassing charges, thus prejudicing his case.The Supreme Court disagreed, indicating that the district court did not err in denying Driver's motion for a new trial or his motion for judgment of acquittal. The court ruled that the district court had not abused its discretion in these decisions, and that there was substantial evidence to support Driver's convictions. In terms of the opening statement and the presentation of evidence, the court found that the State's actions were proper at the time and that any comments made about the dismissed charges were reasonable given the circumstances. The court also noted that the jury had been instructed to disregard any statements made by counsel that were not supported by evidence. As a result, the court affirmed the district court's decision, upholding Driver's conviction. View "State v. Driver" on Justia Law